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Are you a senior law student or a new
attorney, looking for your first professional
position or best location for your office?
Do you know which foundation books to select for your library?
There's an expert in your vicinity who can help you with these
and other questions you' may have that concern your practice.
He makes it hishusiness to know opportunities occurring in your
area.
Just drop us a line and we'll send you his name and address. Then
contact him to see how much. his tips help you.
You could turn his information into )'our business.
or obligation whatever for this advice.
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Digest Editors Roger A. Franklin, Joseph E. DiLoreto

[Jitorial
During our matriculation through Loyola Law School we have witnessed many important and vital changes. Among the most important
has been the construction of a new and magnificent edifice which
houses the Law School. The expansion of the law library to a collection of over 70,000 volumes has been none the less important, and
the addition of new service and clerical facilities to aid the students
in their study and leisure hours has been welcomed. In keeping with
this dynamic under-current
the Loyola Digest has endeavored to expand and improve the calibre of its publication. Most evident has
been the change in the Digest's appearance from a loos~-leaf paper
to a hard cover publication. Greater emphasis has been placed on
student and faculty participation,
and finally the advent of advertising has helped defray the immense cost of publication.
Looking realistically into the future we can envision the birth of
the Loyola Law Review, a hope which is shared by many students and
faculty members. But this goal can only be achieved through the continued perseverance
among the students in bringing it to .fruition.
Continued emphasis must be placed upon the quality of the Digest,
the foundation upon which a law review can immerge.
As we look in retrospect upon the past year, we have mixed emotions of success and failure. But we sincerely hope that our efforts
have created the momentum among the students who follow in achieving this goal of a law review.
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DEAN'S MESSAGE
It was in 1960 that Professor J. Rex
Dibble was named Acting Dean of the Law
School. At the time I was in private practice and teaching part time at Loyola. I
can recall my pleasure over his appointment because I was sure that he would fill
the position of Dean with distinction. As
a former student of Mr. Dibble's, I was
well acquainted with the thoroughness of
preparation
and careful analysis he displayed in the classroom. It was predictable
that these qualities would be reflected in
his work as Dean.
In late 1960 Mr. Dibble was kind enough
to invite me to join the full time faculty.
I did so at about the same time as my
classmate Professor Ogren, another member of the part time faculty, made the same
decision. This was at the beginning of the
spring semester in 1961. Mr. Ogren and
r brought the full time faculty up to seven
members.
In the years that followed, Dean Dibble
pursued his plan to increase the full time
faculty. When Brigadier General Nathan
J. Roberts, U.S. Army Retired, joins the
faculty next summer, there will be fourteen full time members of the faculty.
Eventually there should be between eighteen
and twenty. This growth reflects Dean
Dibble's plan and purpose, with which I
fully agree, that. the principal part of the
students' legal education should be committed to the full time faculty.

.
From the start Dean Dibble pursued a
plan to involve the faculty in policymaking. He instituted the practice of regular monthly faculty meetings at which the
affairs of the Law School are discussed and
decisions reached. The processing of applications for admission became the responsi
bility of a faculty committee, requiring
long hours of work each spring and summer. The difficult and painful task of passing on student petitions for re-admission
after 'disqualification
became a faculty
function. The faculty, responding to the
SPRING, 1986

LLOYD TEVIS
Dean

Dean's
leadership,
willingly
these and many other jobs.

undertook

Since 1960 a number of curricular
changes have occurred. One of the most
notable has been the increase in the number of elective courses. In addition Dean
Dibble came to emphasize more and more
the Legal Writing program. Initially there
was a first-year course. Then a second-year
course was added. Three years ago the program was revised radically by using Student Teaching Fellows. Finally, the Honors
Writ'1pg Program was added. This increasing~mphasis on writing points up the need
felt by Dean Dibble and the faculty that
the students should be given considerable
assistance in improving their writing skills.
Today there is substantially more scholarship money available at Loyola than was
the case in 1960, thanks to the Alumni
. Scholarship Fund. This is another of Dean
Dibble's accomplishments. It took an enormous amount of work to organize an annual
35

drive for contributions from the alumni.
Mr. Dibble would be the first to acknowledge that no amount of work would have
made these drives successful were it not
for the efforts of the Alumni officers and
class captains. Over the last four years the
Dean and these alumni leaders have created
an organization known as The Advocates,
whose members contribute $100.00 per
year to the Alumni Scholarship Fund. Two
years ago The Junior Advocates came into
being. Its membership is confined to memo
bers of the last five graduating classes who
contribute $25.00 per year to the Fund.
Yet another scholarship award was originated by Mr. Dibble-The
Faculty Honor
Award. This is a $500.00 award made annually by the faculty, from its own funds,
to the person chosen as the outstanding
stu~ent in the School who is beginning the
semor year.
.
Throughout the deanship of Mr. Dibble,
_Loyola has tightened noticeably both its
admissions
requirements
and academic
standards. This has in many ways been a
painful process, but there is no doubt that
the School has been benefited. What makes
the feat more remarkable is that it was
accomplished in a period during which the
School's total enrollment rose from 362 in
1960, to 520 in 1965.
Of course, the most apparent achievement of Mr. Dibble, as Dean, is the new
law school building, With faculty assistance, most notably the late Professor A.
Marburg Yerkes, the Dean and several Regents and officers of the University undertook the planning of the new building. It
would be impossible to recount the hours
that went into the evolution of a dream
into reality. The principal witness to the
success of these planners is the building
itself, which is widely acclaimed as one
of the finest in the country. No one who
did not work or attend school in the old
building can appreciate
what a change
Dean Dibble hath wrought!
This has been a short summary of some,
but by no means all, of the highlights of
the administration
given to the School of
Law by my predecessor. I trust that it reflects in some way my appreciation
of
36

his accomplishments. I would not attempt
in this column to express my admiration
for Dean Dibble as a person. He would
not thank me for the attempt. All of us
at Loyola are indeed fortunate that Mr.
Dibble's resignation as Dean does not deprive Loyola of his presence. His counsel
will be an aid to me, the faculty, and the
students in the months and years ahead.

"A FUNNY THING
HApPENED TO ME ON
THE WAY TO THE BAR"
At this time of
the year throughout
the land each college yearbook and
student paper rings
with the promise of
graduation and senior farewells.
We
shall be no different!
It has been three
years and for some
RONALD COHEN
four since we first
President Board of entered Loyola Law
Bar Governors
Schools' hallowed
walls of adobe. The beginning weeks of
our legal education foretold of the exciting experiences which were to come, and to
which we can now look back with a smile
and a tear. The temperature reached an
all time high that first week and the chairs
stuck to our clothing like glue for there
was neither air conditioning nor cross ventilation. The "Tort Burgers" at the greasy
spoon up the block nourished the body so
that an afternoon of Torts became mere
child's play. And who will ever forget the
lone Palm tree which graced the exterior
of the campus; it marked the only bird
cemetary in downtown Los Angeles. Before
we knew it, finals were at hand and we
approached them with the same calm attitude shared by the classes which had gone
before and which have since followed. The
casualty rate was high, but the second year
started with nary a backward glance toLOYOLA DIGEST

ward our old Alma Mater turned parking
lot.
We found ourselves in a new building
with renewed vigor. The first year had
passed quickly and the second year hit us
with unexpected force. The classes were
tougher, the professors more demanding,
the work load was discouraging. The Second Year Doldrums became an epidemic
and each day grew longer. The doubts of
whether it was all worth it plagued our
thoughts as the clocks in the classrooms
never seemed to find the next minute. But
this too came to pass, and now we are on
the last lap of our education. There are
those of us who never thought it would be
over, there are others who are sorry to see
it go. For no matter what each feels now
that law school is almost a memory, it has
been three years of growth and enrichment.
A school must be out of necessity more
than its campus, or it's professors; a school
must be a heritage. The Student Board

•

of Bar Governors in its role as student
spokesman and faculty laison has tried to
bring to the students a feeling of pride in
accomplishment.
The Scott Moot Court
Competition reflects on the excellence of
skills developed at Loyola as demonstrated
by the caliber of preparation. The Orientation Programs achievements can be measured by the acclimation of the first year
class to the demanding requirements imposed by the legal curriculum. The Loyola
Digest has achieved its 'deserved distinction
as a periodical of importance in the legal
community.
The Annual Spring Dance
gives us the opportunity to meet in friendship and good natured mischief.
When each of us has reached the status
of Alumni, we should be able to look back
and say thank you Loyola for the oppor·
tunity you have given us and for your
guidance and counsel during our years of
education. The Graduating class of 1966
can say this wholeheartedly!
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REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS AND THE
SIX MONTH HOLDING
PERIOD
By lames K. Herbert*
A mania for long-term capital gain has
come to be a hallmark of our system of
tax law, with immeasurable effort being
spent by both taxpayers and their counsel
searching for situations which will generate
this prized commodity. To achieve the desired goal, a taxpayer must find a situation
in which profit will be realized "from [1]
the sale or exchange of [2] a capital asset
[as defined in the Code] ['3] held for
more than six months,"? Real estate, and
especially California real estate, presents
the ideal situation for many taxpayers. Because of the state's burgeoning population
which is resulting in the rapid urbanization
of rural areas, real estate values in California are rising at a fair pace. Assuming
a taxpayer has not been too exuberant and
is not tainted with the status of a dealer,
profit received from the sale of real estate
is subject to long-term capital-gains' treatment, if the real estate has been held for
more than six months.
The holding period requirement is commonly regarded as the least complicated
of the three elements necessary to qualify
a transaction for long-term capital-gain
treatment. Nevertheless, it can pose some
intriguing problems, especially to the taxpayer who has just acquired control over a
parcel 'of land (whether it be by option,
contract or obtaining actual title) and is
presented with an offer to sell that land
at a tidy profit by a developer who demands immediate possession. The problems
and some suggested solutions may be discussed with reference to the following short
factual situation:
On January 1, 1964, Taxpayer acquires
from Farmer options good until December
30, 1964, to purchase Orangeacre, Lemonacre and Limeacre, three one-hundred acre
citrus groves at $10,000jacre. The contracts
=Member California
Bar, Lecturer
versity School of Law.
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which will arise upon Taxpayer's exercise
of his options are subject to conditions
that soil tests show each grove to be suitable for residential development and, of
course, that the title is marketable.
On October 1, 1964,having satisfied himself that there is or soon will be an opportunity to resell the three groves at a
good profit, Taxpayer exercises his options
and an escrow is opened with the local
title company to complete the purchase
and sale. Because of unforeseen problems
in curing title defects and in obtaining
the necessary data to determine the soil
bearing capacity of the groves, the escrow
remains open tor nine months, and does
not close until July 1, 1965.
So long as Taxpayer disposes of the
three groves anytime after January 1, 1966,
his profit will be eligible for long-term
capital-gains treatment. January 1, 1966,
is, however, some twenty-four months after
Taxpayer acquired the right to' purchase
the groves at the bargain prtce of $10,0091
acre. If Taxpayer's judgment has been
good and the groves are in the immedtaze
path of expansion, obviously offers from
developers may come in much sooner than
January 1, 1966. Assume Taxpayer receives offers to buy the respective groves
as follows: (1) Orangeacre-subsequent
to
the execution of the option but prior to
its exercise; (2) Lemonacre-c-subsequent to
the exercise of the option but prior to the
close Q1fescrow; (3) Ltmeaere=-immediately after the close of escrow. Developer is
willing to pay Taxpayer $13,OOOjacre,but
because he wants immediate possession to'
begin building houses, he states each time
that, unless he can have the one hundred
acres that he needs, he will look elsewhere
for land. How can Taxpayer complete each
deal and still preserve long-term capitalgains treatment for each of his $300,00Q
profits?
. A. The Offer Subsequent To The Execution
Of The Option But Prior To Its Exercise
(herein of the sale of an option) :
An option to purchase what would be a
capital asset is itself a capital asset, and
if held for more than six months, the gain
from sale of the' option is eligible for longterm capital-gains treatment." Thus, anytime after July 1, 1964, Taxpayer may sell
his Orange acre option to Developer and receive the same low tax rate on his profits
as he. would have received had he exercised
his option, taken title to Orangeacre and
held it until January 1, 1966.
LOYOLA DIGEST

Even though the rules are plain and
simple, taxpayers have more than once
failed to follow the form necessary to
achieve the desired results." The asset being
sold is an option to purchase, not the property itself. Unless this is made abundantly
clear in the papers documenting the transaction, the Commissioner will assert that
it is Orange acre, not the option, which has
been sold and that the gain, having resulted
from the sale of a newly acquired asset
(the property itself) held for less than six
months, is taxable at ordinary income rates.
It will not suffice that the net result of the
transaction is a deed running directly from
Farmer (the optioner) to Developer (the
third party offeror). Taxpayer (the optionee) must do more than merely see that
title to Orangeacre never passes through
himself. The papers documenting the transaction with Developer must in no way indicate that Taxpayer is exercising his option
or selling Orangeacre to Developer." The
transaction with Developer involves only
the sale of an option. T4e papers should
so state and this intention should be manifested in the mechanics of the transaction.
The transaction between Developer and
Taxpayer probably can be effectuated best
by an escrow separate and apart from the
escrow involved in the actual sale of
Oranageacre. Developer will obviously not
wish to pay Taxpayer any money until he
is assured of obtaining marketable title to
Orangeacre. On the other hand, Taxpayer
will not wish to give Developer the right
to exercise the option until he is sure Developer will give him his bargained for
$3,000/acre
override. The safest way to
accomplish the goals of both parties would
be to deliver the option to an escrow holder
under instructions that it is not to be exercised until Developer has placed into that
escrow all the papers and money necessary
to comply with the contract of purchase and
sale which will arise upon the exercise of
the option. Once Developer has complied,
the escrow holder may exercise the Orangeacre option, complete the transaction between Farmer and Developer in a separate
escrow an? upon transfer of title to DeSPRING, 1966

veloper pay $1,000,000
to Farmer and
$300,000 to Taxpayer. Because Taxpayer
has sold a capital asset (the option to
purchase Orangeacre)
which he has held
for more than six months, his $300,000
profit will be eligible for long-term capitalgain treatment.

B. The Offer Subsequent To The Exercise
Of The Option But Prior To The Close
Of Escrow (herein of the sale of an
executory contract) :
Although not expressly stated in the
Code, an executory contract to purchase
what would be a capital asset is, like an
option, a capital asset." Consequently, Taxpayer may sell his executory contract to
purchase Lemonacre and still receive longterm capital-gains treatment on his $300,000 profit just as in the sale of the Orangeacre option. What was said in the previous
section with respect to the mechanics of
the transaction involving the Orange acre
option applies equally to the sale of the
Lemonacre executory contract. The asset
being sold is not Lemonacre, but the executory contract to purchase Lemonacre, and
the papers documenting the transaction
should so state. As in the option situation,
nothing should be done to indicate that
Taxpayer is buying and then immediately
reselling Lemonacre.
The date on which Taxpayer may sell the
Lemonacre
contract and still have his
$300,000 profit eligible for long-term capital-gains treatment presents some fascinat. ing problems. Recall that the option in the
hypothetical was exercised on October 1,
1964. Anytime prior to that date and subsequent to July 1, 1964, Taxpayer could
have sold his Lemonacre option and unquestionably have received long-term capital-gains treatment on the sales proceeds.
Can Taxpayer also sell his executory contract anytime after October 1, 1964, and
also expect to receive long-term capitalgains treatment on his profit?
The Commissioner has taken the position,
and has been upheld by at least one court, G
that an executory contract is an asset separate and apart from the option out of
which it arises and as such has its own
39

holding period which commences with the
exercise, not the execution of the option.
Under this theory, Taxpayer could not sell
his executory contract until sometime after
April 1, 1965. While, admittedly there are
differences between options and contracts
to purchase, the case for declaring them
to be two different assets each with its own
holding period appears to be weak. First,
in both instances the item being sold is no
more then the right to buy Lemonacre. Although there are additional burdens attached to the contract (i.e., the duty to perform), these are burdens which ultimately
must be assumed by Developer if he is to
acquire the subject of both the option and
the contract, i.e., Lemonacre. Second, in
California at least, because of the interesting interaction of the rules involving the
measure of damages for breach of a contract to purchase real property, the antideficiency legislation and the California
Supreme Court's view with respect to the
forfeiture of earnest money, as a practical
matter there is little difference between
the buyer-seller
relationship
before and
after exercise of an option.' It seems as
though this is a classical situation for the
courts to look through form to substance
and hold that the option and the contract
are for tax purposes one and the same asset,
i.e., the right to buy Lemonacre.
Assuming for the sake of argument that
the option and contract are separate assets,
Section 1223 (1) offers interesting possibilities for tacking the holding period of
. the option to that of the executory con-·
tract. Section 1223 (1) provides in part:
"In determining the period for which the
taxpayer has held property received in an
exchange, there shall be included the
period for which he held the property exchanged if, under tl:is chapter, the property has. for the purpose of determining
gain or loss from a sale or exchange. the
same basis in whole or in part in his hands
as the property exchanged ....
" (Emphasis added.)

If the executory contract which arises
from the exercise of an option is a separate
asset, how was it acquired? Was it purchased? The option is purchased, but is
the executory contract? The executory con40

tract comes into being only after the option is extinguished by exercise, and .thus
it does not seem illogical to argue that it
was exchanged for the option. Now, one
could argue similarly with respect to the
fee simple estate in Limeacre which is transfered to Taxpayer once the executory contract to' purchase it is extinguished at the
close of the escrow; but as pointed out in
the next section, the holding period of Limeacre is measured from the close of escrow,
not from the date the executory contract to
purchase it came into being. Note, however, thai the fee simple estate has its own
basis which is determined by the purchase
price paid for it, thus Section 1223 (1)
by definitionwould
not apply. On the other
hand, the executory contract which arises
out of the exercise of the option has the
s~me basis as the option and thus, if the
exchange criterion is satisfied, the transaction would appear to fulfill all of t4,e
elements of Section 1223 (1) ."
Although at this point in time it would
be imprudent to advise the sale of ar
executory contract less than six months
after it was created, if in a situation involving a contract which has arisen from
the exercise of an option there is no other
alternative or if one is presented with the
accomplished fact of a sale, the case for
dating the holding period from the execution rather than the exercise of the option
is certainly far from frivolous:
C. The Offer Subsequent To The Close Of
Escrow But Prior To The Expiration
Of The Six Months Holding Period
(herein of the transfer of possession
with option to buy):
In common understanding,
according ·to
the United States Supreme Court," to hold
property is to own it; and under long-established rules, a taxpayer does not own property until he either takes title to it or enters
into possession under an unconditional contract of sale." Unlike the commodity trader," the real estate investor cannot tack
the holding period of the contract under
which he acquired the real estate to that of
the real estate. Consequently, if Taxpayer
has let the escrow close on the Limeacre
transaction, the clock begins ticking all over
LOYOLA DIGES'I;

again and his holding period dates from
July 1, 1965, even though his right to
purchase has existed since J a:nuary 1, 1964.
Under pain of losing long-term capital.
gains treatment, he cannot close the sale
of Limeacre until sometime after January
1, 1966.
The challenge to Taxpayer's counsel is
to devise a scheme whereby Developer can
take possession but Taxpayer can for tax
purposes keep the transaction open until
January 1, 1966. It is very clear that the
desired goal cannot be achieved by merely
instructing the escrow holder to keep the
deed and money in escrow until the holding period has run, since the passage of
title is not the sole criterion for determining the date on which a transaction is completed for tax purposes." The transaction
would be considered completed for tax purposes whenever Developer takes possession
of Limeacre under an unconditional contract of sale. There is, of course, always
tbe possibility of leaving one or two items
of t.he deal at loose ends until the holding
period has run, but the Commissioner and
the courts are taking a close look at these
transactions and have found transactions to
be complete as soon as all material conditions are satisfied."
Some practitioners have suggested that
!axp~yer's problem may be solved by leasmg Limeacre to Developer with an option
to purchase exercisable only after Taxpayer's holding period exceeds six months.
There is some authority to support this
proposition."
On the' other hand, there is
the danger that this type of transaction
would be classified as a conditional sale
esp~cially if the lease payments are applied
'~gamst the purchase price. Furthermore,'
the rental payments 'will be treated as ordinary income which in part defeats Taxpayer's objective which is to maximize his
long-term capital gains.
The better solution appears to have been
suggested by the Commissioner in one of
his own rulings:
"A delivery of possession under a mere
option agreement, however is without siz-:
nificance until a oontract of sale com~s
into being through exercise of the option,
SPRING, 1966

so that the holding period of the seller
cannot end before that date.""
.
Under this rule Taxpayer could transfer
possession to Developer and- not be concerned with los'ing his long-term capitalgains treatment so long as .nobinding CIi>Utract of sale came into existence prior to
the expiration
of Taxpayer's
holding
period. Query, however, whether the courts
under the principle of looking through
form to substance might not consider the
commencement
of Developer's
building
program as an exercise of the option, regardless of what the supporting documents,
i.e., the option contract, stated. To add substance to the transaction, it would be wise
not to transfer such burdens of ownership
as property taxes and the risk of loss to
Developer until the option is exercised.
Note also that thought must be given
to aspects other than tax. It is possible that
in six months time, Developer could so
mutilate
Limeacre
with semi-completed
improvements
and leave it so bJrdehed
with -mechanics' liens as to put Taxpayer
in a worse position than if he had sold
Limeacre outright and taken short-term
capital-gains treatment on his profit. Certainly Taxpayer should take a sizeable option payment from Developer. Furthermore
Taxpayer should have the right to approve
all improvements which Developer contemplates adding to the property and Developer should be required to adequately insure that Taxpayer will be indemnified for
any mechanics' liens which might be filed
by. a contractor or materialman.
Conclusion
Under the present state of authorities a
real estate transaction which commences
with execution of an option involves at
least three assets: the option, the executory
contract and the fee simple estate in the
property which is the subject of the transaction. The astute investor will do everything in his power to make sure that, if
necessary, each of these assets can be held
for at least six months. Furthermore, both
before the exercise of the option and before the close of escrow, the investor should
make sure there are no advantageous sales
(Continued no page 68)
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A PSYCHOLOGICAL
VIEWPOINT OF THE LAW
AND INSANITY

1. The Problem
The connection between criminal and
psychologically
abnormal
behaviour
is
made to lesser or greater degrees by most
of those who have studied the field; few
would deny that at least some correlation
exists. "Criminality and mental illness are
evidence of the insufficiency or breakdown
. . . (of a person's) controls. Both are indicative of a losing struggle to maintain a
controlled relationship with the social environment. Both are products of an inner
conflict. Neither 'causes' an individual to
do wrong; they are both processes reflecting
the breakdown of psychic controls and the
release of 'latent antisocial drives common
to us all. One man resolves the conflict by
acting it out in crime; another by living
it out- in mental illness. The mentally ill
person who commits a crime is cursed with
a double failure of adaptation."!
All of
us have some criminal tendencies; most of
us are healthy enough to cope with them.
Thus, criminals are looked on by socii:tl
scientists and others as people who have
deviated from the normal pattern of living
for any number of reasons, including acute
situational stress, a weak personality, or
exposure to a criminal environment. Theoretically, the possibility for rehabilitation
exists for most of these people if they are
'recognized and dealt with as being sick;
in practice, some deviant types are more
amenable to cure than others.
The prevalence of criminal insanity is
borne out by research studies. Under a
Massachusetts' law, which requires a psychiatric examination of those "indicted by a
grand jury for a capital offense or . . .
known to have been previously convicted
for any other offense more than once, or to
have been previously
convicted
of a
felony," 6591 persons have been examined
since 1921.2 Of these, 81% had no men-

tal disease or defect affecting criminal responsibility,
1.20/0 were definitely psychotic, 5.40/0 were borderline, 5.50/0 were
recommended for observation, and 0.8%
had other abnormal conditions. In all, the
percentages of mental deviation, defect, abnormality, and illness was greater than for
the general population." In another more
dramatic, but less systematic study, 59 men
and 7 women charged with murder were
given psychiatric examinations. Thirty were
found to have no psychiatric abnormality,
18 were diagnosed as having psychopathic
personalities,
14 had psychotic illnesses,
and 4 were mentally subnormal. Of these,
17 were found insane by the court and 8
others were not convicted."
Although the question of sanity is not
uncommon in civil cases, it is rarely used
in criminal cases and even then, generally,
as the last resort. Why is it that the generally acknowledged level of crim'inal insanity is so much higher than the number
of insanity pleas? First, the laws relating
to insanity are often out of touch with
psychiatric knowledge and present many
difficulties in application. THis aspect will
be covered in detail in a later part of this
paper. Secondly, it is usually very difficult
to prove the linkage between insanity and
the time of the crim'inal act. The mental
state of the 'defendant at the time of the
offense may change; the defendant is seldom aware of the connection of his unconscious mental state and his actions, and
psychiatrists may have different theoretical
orientations and make different kinds of
judgments-this
is why they sometimes disagree in court as to their diagnosis. Isaac
Ray, in his classic "Treatise on the Medical
Jurisprudence
of Insanity," further elaborates on the problem.
"In conversing with patients
on topics
foriegn to their morbid delusions, you will
generally find no difference between them
and other people. They not only deal with
common-place notions, but are capable of
appreciating
new facts and trains of
reasoning. Still more, they retain their
sense of good and
evil, right
and
wrong ... "5

"'B.S. U.C.L.A.
1963, M.A. U.C.L.A,
1964, Currently
in pursuit of Doctorate, Leeds University, England.

Thirdly, there is still a considerable lack
of understanding of mental illness by most

By Mel Berger*
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people. The insane are seen as people who
are very unlike the rest of us, very strange
and different. Just the word "insane"
causes a strong negative emotional reaction
in most of us-someone
is either sane or
insane, sick or not sick. Psychiatry has long
ago rejected this rigid dichotomy in favor
of seeing mental health along a continuum
and of seeing different aspects of individual
behaviour as functional or dysfunctional in
a given situation. But these attitudes continue to have widespread impact on the
lawyer, judge, jury, prosecutor, and defendant. The defendant, or someone acting on his behalf and with his consent, is
the only one who can initiate an insanity
plea. Whether he does so is probably based
more on legal aspects of his case than on
the medical reality of his mental health.
That is, will his criminal punishment be
substantially worse than hospital rehabilitation in terms of severity and length of time;
also taking into consideration the impact of
the idea of his being insane on both himself
a~d those around him, such as his family,
fnends, and employers. Also, thought of
prison life may actually evoke fewer fears
of unknown terrors than life in a mental
hospital.
II. What are the Goals of Law?
Before considering specific laws, it is
necessary to think about the current bzoals
of the law and about whether they are the
best goals. Is the purpose to deter others,
to attempt to rehabilitate the law breaker
.
'
t~ protect SOCIety,or to satisfy society's deSIre for revenge? The particular goals and
their priorities are relevant in assessing
current laws and thinking about the need
~or new ones. Some criminologists see punl~hment as an outstanding feature in the
development of the taw throughout the
~g~s and still. of u~m?~t importance today.
SInce man In primitivr, society believed
that his behaviour was determined by fate
or governed by divine guidance, there was
no reason for him to find a motivation for
his actions. Today, of course, we know that
there is always some motivation behind
criminal behaviour. When we do not find
it too readily, it does not mean that none
exists; rather, it is Simply more unconscious ...
SPRING. 1966

"It is not surprising, then
that the
enormous quantity of legal records and
texts collected from the earliest days con
tains Iittle information about the criminal
himself.
"What stands out in sharp contrast to
this distinct lack of understanding
the
offender is the strong reaction of the
people to the culprit. There is hardly any
aspect of human life in which a people's
emotions and hostilities have been more
forcefully expressed than in their attitude
toward the man who has broken the law.
When law-abiding citizens react mercilessly toward a criminal and his deed, it is
not only because they want to see the law
obeyed or because they want retribution,
but also because the offender acts out antisocial impulses which so many people
would like to act out but do not dare to
do SIO because they fear the consequences.?Without going into a deep psychological
explanation, I will put forth some evidence
which would seem to suggest that the severity of punishment is more related to the
emotional reaction of the public than to
either the severity of the crime itself or
to the .individual committing the offense.
In a 'large scale study in Philadelphia, it
was found that the major factor in severity
of sentences given was the specificity of
the victim. If the victim was a private individual, the punishment was worse than if
the crime was against the general public.
Hence, felonious assault, robbery, and
homicide is dealt with more severely than
narcotics and fraud." Yet the former crimes
are usually less premeditated, often "attributable to. passion and to embittered,
frustrated, or actually disordered personality." It would seem that punishment and
threat is least likely to deter these crimes."
• In the south, capital punishment may be
used in rape cases; however, "although
B09-white men had been convicted' of rape
since 1909, not one had been executed.
During the same period, 54 Negroes. were
executed on rape' convictions.?" Could this
most extreme case be anything but the reaction of society, based on the values and
fear of that society? Further, the amount
of publicity given a case also affects the
severity of punishment, often by increasing
public _outcry and the need to set an example. Those caught who were involved
43

in the recent highly publicized "Great
Train Robbery" in England were given unheard-of-30-year
sentences.
Assuming this to be the situation, does
punishment serve a useful and necessary
function for society-that
of an outlet for
antisocial aggression? One hopes that this
is not the case, or that, if it is, something
can be done to rechannel this need into
more human directions. Most legal and
penal systems in Western Europe, outside
of England, have been moving more and
more towards the goal of "social defense;"
that is, the protection of society as the
most important aim of the law."? Does
punishment deter others in society? This
probably depends on the type of crime. According to some studies, it is the certainty.
that punishment will actually result, rather
than the severity of the punishment which
is the most effective deterrent. " ...
The
most ferocious penalties are ineffective so
long as the prospective criminals believe
they have a fair chance of escaping
them . . ."11 Does punishment cure the
offender? Again, this probably depends on
the. type of criminal. A large-scale study
defining different criminal types and the
effect of different deterrents on them would
seem a highly worthwhile project.
III. Insanity and Criminal Law
The law traditionally,
and as set down
in the M'Naghten Rule, has viewed insanity from only one aspect, that of intellectual knowledge. Did the offender cognitively (intellectually)
know that he was
doing something wrong? This ignores other
aspects of knowing and of motivationspecifically,
volition and emotion. "Psychiatry and current law have different concepts of this word ("know"). To the psychiatrist, to Know means to understand;
that is, it is an emotional understanding,
involving the ability to use knowledge and
reasoning whereby a person can emotionally discriminate the essentials of the matter. Our psychological knowledge of today
makes understanding a much more encompassing process than the law implied in the
word "know" over one hundred years
ago."12 To give a few examples, a child
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often does things which he knows are wrong
or hurtful without being emotionally aware
of the consequences. He does not completely
understand that if he hits little brother,
little brother will feel hurt; similarly, he
must burn himself before he fully understands what "hot" is. People who drive
recklessly don't connect this with having
an auto accident. People don't wear seat
belts because they don't really (emotionally) think an accident could ever happen
to them. It is hard to react to someonedying unless it is connected to a person
we know, then the consequences are much
more fully experienced. Many smokers intellectually know that cigarettes are harmful to their health but don't connect it to
themse1ves-"it
~ould never happen to me."
In all these examples, people "know" something in one sense of the word (intellectually), yet don't "know" in another sense.
This is not to say that people shouldn't be
held responsible for all their actions; rather
that the criminal offender should be considered from more than one point of view
in assessing his guilt and in determining
how he should be dealt with in order to
facilitate his rehabilitation
and to protect
society. The number of persons who take
their punishment and go back to society
and continue to commit offenses is a sad
testimonial to the failure in dealing successfully with the criminal. The role of the
unconscious has also largely been, ignored
by the law. A person may know he is
doing wrong but thinks that he is acting
on God's command, or he may believe that
people are trying to kill him and he is
only protecting himself when he strikes'
back at the imagined culprit.
In recent years, progress has been made,
though slowly, in broadening this traditional approach. In the specific case of the
M'N aghten Rule, there have been a number
of 'different approaches to its modification.
The most important of these is the Durham
Rule of 1954.13 Its main feature was to
change the test of insanity from "the ability
to distinguish right from wrong" to "was
the criminal act the product of a mental
illness or defect?" A most important feature of the product is that it does not deLOYOLA DIGEST

fine insanity in a rigid way (as the ability
to distinguish right from wrong). It does
not "attempt to write into law any psychiatric dogma, no matter how sound it may
appear today. It would not define mental
disease or defect, but would leave the law
free to incorporate new content into those
terms with the advance of scientific knowledge. Nor would it 'dictate to the psychiatrist any artificial formula for determining whether the act was the product of
the disease or defect. "14 But because of
this open-errdedness, the Durham Rule is
also open to justifiable criticism. It "does
not clarify sufficiently the casual connection between the mental condition and the
act. For instance, how much a product of
mental illness must the criminal act have
been?" ...
(To) establish the connection
between a criminal act and a person's mental condition is extremely difficult in many
cases. This difficulty is magnified when
presented to a jury ... "15 Each criticism
seems to have something to offer, and it
would be sad if one were sacrificed for
the sake of the other.
Another approach
was taken by the
Model Penal Code drafted by the American
Law Institute. It deals with mental responsibility as follows:
"A person is not responsible' for criminal
conduct if, at the time of such conduct,
as a result of mental disease or defect, he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements
of law."lG
"The substantial capacity to conform his
conduct to the law" has been brought into
some state recommendations
For changes,
as in California and New York.!"
Whether this is an improvement over
the product rule is unclear. Both approaches, however, are a great improvement over M'Naghten as they narrow the
gap between the legal and psychiatric definitions of insanity. The Diminished Responsibility Rule represents another, somewhat different, approach to broadening the
traditional view.l" The question now arises,
will any of these approaches gain widespread formal leg~l acceptance and, if they
SPRING, 1966

do, will they actually be used? Many fear
that they will lead to too many uncertainties
and difficulties in application. But, yet, this
is an accurate reflection of the reality of
the situation; it is difficult to assess insanity, but surely this is no reason to ignore
its existance. Besides, much of the current
broadness and uncertainty of the law is
of considerable value. "Many fundamental
principles of criminal and civil justice are
expressed in broad phrases such as 'due
process,' 'unreasonable,' and 'mens rea.' "19
There are a number of other related
issues which will be considered, briefly,
for want of time and space:
(1) Who should initiate insanity proceedings? There are a considerable number of offenders who would be recognized
as being mentally abnormal had they undergone a psychiatric examination.i'' The previously mentioned Massachusetts law is a
response to this situation. Also, as mentioned, not all mentally abnormal criminals
will claim insanity. Therefore, if society
wishes to' deal with them as insane, either
the state, or some other neutral body, must
seek them out. It would seem reasonable
to have this 'examination only after conviction and would be a determinate of sentencing. Under a New York law passed in
1950, sexual psychopaths were given "an
indeterminate confinement (by which was
meant from one day to life) with psychiatric treatment ... "21 A number of other
states, including California, Minnesota, and
West Virginia, also have enacted progressive sex offender laws whose aim is both
to protect society from premature release
of a mentally dangerous, individual and to
rehahilitate"
Why can't these laws be extended to other types of offenses?
Voluntary commitment, such as in California, is also an important step. Where
insanity is an issue in a plea, as in "diminished responsibility,"
psychiatric treatment
should be mandatory. It makes little sense
to plead insanity and then not be given
treatment or, occasionally, to be released
outright.
(2) Who should give evidence as to insanity? How should it be given? Surprisingly, "in many states there is nothing to
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prevent practically any licensed physician
from testifying as an expert on any condition, be it a mental or an' organic one. "~3
A majority of both lawyers and psychiatrists believe that only a professional psychiatrist should give testimony in court. 24
Whether the psychiatrist should be considered an impartial expert called by the court
or whether each side should call their own
witnesses is a subject of great disagreement.
As it stands now, the jury may be subjected
to clashing views with the. implication of
partiality attached to each.
As to the second question, the psychiatrist "should at least be given the right
... to present his views fully and coherently, instead of being forced to take part in
a play of questions and answers ... Having
presented his views, he should, of course,
be subject to examination and cross-examination. "25 On both of these points, fuller
utilization of the psychiatrist seems possible. One way of achieving this might be to
have him testify as amicus curiae (friend
of the court)-an
objective, impartial expert.
(3) Who should decide questions of insanity? According to a survey taken, half
of the lawyers sampled thought that a panel
of psychiatric and legal experts, or psychiatric experts alone should decide.?"
In 1838, Isaac Ray made the following
plea which is still most appropriate:
"It is one of those wise provislons in the
arrangement of things, that the power of
perceiving the good and the evil, is never
unassociated
with that of obtaining the
'one and avoiding the other. When, therefore, disease has brought upon an individual the very opposite condition, enlightened jurisprudence will hold out to him
its protection, instead of crushing him as
a sacrifice to violated justice.">'
1. Weihofen,
Henry, Tbe Urge to Punish,
lancz Ltd., London, 1957, p. 92.
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2. Abrahamsen,
David, Tbe Ps ycbolo gy of Crime, Columbia University Press, New York, 1960, p. 263 (citing
Briggs Laws in Massachusetts,
Chapter
123, General
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RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY:
AN IMPORTANT REFORM IN
CRIMINAL LAW
By Loyola Debate Team,
William

Watsman, President

"We have long known the administration of criminal law to be antiquated and
barbaric, yet reform, under the influence
of SOCiologists, has occurred only in the
theories and practices of post-conviction
treatment."!
A fundamental purpose of any trial is
the ascertainment of the truth. This goal
is particularly significant in the criminal
trial, where a decision based upon inadequate knowledge of all the relevant facts
may free a guilty person or send an innocent man to jail. A procedural reform
which seeks to promote the ascertainment
of the facts should be given extensive study,
and if it proves feasible, should be univel:sally adopted.
Pre-trial discovery is such a procedure,
and it has already been widely used in the
civil courts for some time. The philosophy
behind discovery, a fuller presentation of
the facts, is as applicable in criminal cases
as in civil cases, yet criminal discovery
is virtually non-existent. When discovery
procedures were initiated in the civil courts
they were denounced as a watering down
of the adversary system. Their subsequent
success in enhancing "the ability of counsel
to contest the factual issues in controversy"" supplementing rather than hindering the adversary system, has proved ho,:,"
well it can work.
If its efficacy in one area has been demonstrated, why has it not been applied in
the other? First because until very recently,
criminal law has been a neglected area
of American jurisprudence.
The small
number of criminal law courses offered in
even the major schools is evidence of this
problem. Second, most of the discussion
of the procedure has centered on granting
discovery to either the prosecution or the
defense, but seldom to both, as is the case
in the civil courts. Yet it is precisely in
establishing reciprocal pre-trial discovery
LOYOLA DIGES.T

that the procedure can be used to its fullest
advantage, for the prosecution, the defense
and the trial courts.
An example of the difficulties caused by
concentrating on a one-sided approach to
discovery is the article which appeared in
the Fall 1965 issue of the Loyola Digest
"The Case Against Prosecution Discovery."
The article was an expression of concern
about the implication of the recent case of
] ones V. Superior Court where California
Court upheld prosecution discovery. In support of his position against prosecution discovery, the author turned to several previous cases in other states. Learned Hand
was quoted in U.S. V. Garrison et al3 as
being opposed to prosecution discovery because " ... Under our criminal procedure
the accused has every advantage, while the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he
need not disclose the barest outline of his
defense ... " However, further reading
of that decision discloses that Hand was
not supporting the status quo, but making
a complaint about it:
"Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has
always been haunted by the ghost of the
innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream. What we need to fear is the archaic
formaIism and the watery sentiment that
obstructs, delays and defeats the prosecutaon crime."
Among the other often quoted dicta is
Chief Justice Vanderbilt of New Jersey in
State V. Tune:" " ...
in view of the defendant's constitutional and statutory protections against self-incrimination, the state
has no right whatever to' demand an inspection of any of his documents or to take his
deposition, or to submit interrogatories to
him." Once again, Vanderbilt's statement
in its full context cannot be viewed as a
condemnation of pre-trial discovery:
"... the state is completely at the mercy
of the defendant who can produce surprise
evidence at the trial ...
and generally
introduce any sort of unrorseeable evidence
he desires in his own defense'. To allow
him to discover the prosecutor's whole case
against him would make the prosecutor's
task almost insurmountable."
Rather than a condemnation of discovery
per se, the statement was against one-sided
SPRING, 1966 ,.

discovery and unrestricted defense discovery:
"Liberal discovery procedures in preparation for trial are essential to any modern
judicial system in which the search for
truth in aid of justice is paramount and
in which concealment and surprise are not
to be tolerated."
Even if a proposal only called for some
form of prosecution discovery, it might still
be a valuable addition to the criminal trial,
provided that it did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The most
extensive prosecution discovery procedure
that is in use today is found in the alibi
laws of fourteen states, including such large
jurisdictions as New York, New Jersey,
Ohio and Michigan. These laws, which vary
greatly from state to state, in general require five days notice prior to trial of intention to rely upon a defense of alibi. Several require a list of witnesses the defense
intends to call, and these have proved to
be the most effective. Chief Justice Earl
Warren, while a prosecuting attorney, expressed his approval of the alibi provision:
"I am heartily in favor of the provision
of law which requires the defendant to
give five days notice of intention to rely
upon the defense of alibi ... I can see no
reason why a defendant who was not present at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense should hide the' fact from
the prosecuting officer or the court, I am
sure a law of this kind will have a salutary errect.''«
More recently, two surveys, by the California State Law Revision Commission in
1961 and David Epstein, Chief Researcher
for 'the Pennsylvania Committee on Criminal Procedural Rules, studied the workings of these laws, and both issued reports
approving them and suggesting their adoption.
These alibi laws are beneficial for three
basic reasons. First, they serve to eliminate
the element of surprise. "the bane of prosecutors,"" from the criminal trial. The California Commission reported on the situation'
without the alibi provision:
"The testimony concerning the alibi may
take the prosecution completely by surprise
and result in an unjust acquittal because
the prosecution has little or no opportunity
to investigate the credibtltty of the alibi
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witnesses and their statements."?
Precisely the same sentiment has been expressed by the Superior Court of Queens
County in People V. Schade (1936),8
Leona Esch, Operating Director of the
Cleveland Association for Criminal J ustice," and Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney W. C. Waddington.l" With pre-trial
notice, the prosecution has an opportunity
to investigate prior to the actual introduction of the testimony. Otherwise, everything
the defense claims in his trial may come
as a complete surprise to the prosecution.
The false alibi had been successfully used
to such an extent that it is "one of the main
avenues of escape of the guilty.":" The hip
pocket al'ibi, produced in the final hours
of the trial, has also been a favorite defense for organized criminals. "Before the
prosecution has an opportunity to investigate and demonstrate the falsity of the alibi,
the trial is over and a dangerous menace
to society may have been set free."12 With
the alibi statutes, however, the fraudulent
defense -is less successful, and there is a
significant increase in convictions.
The pre-trial investigation gives rise to
two other advantages, the saving of time
and money, and the deterring of perjured
testimony. This form of prosecution discov- '
ery can result in such savings because with
the investigation, 1) if the alibi is true,
the costly trial process is unnecessary and
the case can be dismissed; and 2) if the
alibi is false, the prosecution is prepared
at trial to refute the claim and there is no
need for a continuance within the trial. The
need for a continuance to search out rebuttal evidence may be detrimental to the
prosecution because it's case may become
stale in the jury's mind, and the continuance
may not be sufficient to find new evidence.
More important however, may be the psychological impact that a well engineered
surprise will have on the jury, "the reaction
which follows tends to operate as an immediate conviction that the side which has
achieved a perfectly executed strategic surprise is right. "13
In its effect as a deterrent to perjury, the
alibi law makes its greatest contribution
to the administration
of criminal justice.
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Chief Justice Vanderbilty wrote in Tune
"the presence of perjury in criminal proceedings today is extensive despite the efforts of the courts to eradicate it and constitutes a very serious threat to the administration Iof criminal justice . . ." W. C.
Waddington writes "Quite clearly the alibi
is a legitimate defense but too often our
trial courts stand mute witness to falsified
evidence of alibi."?" Discovery is an effective deterrent because the witness knows
that his story will be investigated beforehand, and an alibi discredited in court is
worse than no defense at all. The conclusion of the California Commission was
that "in most cases the accused would not
have offered perjured alibi testimony if
the prosecution had investigated the alibi
and the witnesses who were called.Y'" The
Epstein survey reported a reduction in the
ntimber of alibi defenses offered with the
,passage of the statute.l"
,
Discovery for the defendant is also found
in some jurisdictions on a limited scale, by
informal arrangements where the defense
attorney is known by the prosecutor, and
occasionally by statute. On the federal level, discovery is granted only in isolated
cases, and U.S. V. Murray interpreted the
Federal Rules 'of Criminal Procedure as
meaning that the accused had no right
to inspect his own confession prior to trial
on the ground that he had no property right
therein. Under the "Jencks"
statute 18
U.S.C. 3500, the accused is prohibited from
obtaining documents obtained from third
persons other than by seizure or process.!"
_The overall picture remains
as Judge
Jerome Frank wrote in Courts on Trial
"In most jurisdictions, discovery in criminal cases is denied even where permitted
is narrowly Iimited.Y'"
Discovery for the defense offers some
very obvious advantages to the defending
attorney, for in the typical case, the prosecutor will be in possession of the physical
details of the crime. It is sometimes possible for the defense to inspect the evidence
against him, but it may require a court
order which is seldom granted. Only when
the defendant is charged with a crime
where the sentence may be death do all
LOYOLA DIGEST

not only is speeded up but made more fair
and exact."25

American courts require the gQvernment
to supply the defendant with the names
of witnesses."
Most suspects of major
crimes are tried UPQn an indictment from
a grand jury after listening to the state's
witnesses. Once the case is in the grand
jury's hands, it is shrouded with secrecy
and "only under the most extraordinary
circumstances may the defendant obtain the
minutes of that body though the govemment may use them for many purposes.'?"
This is not the case in California, where
minutes of the grand jury are not CQn·
sidered as classified secrets and a defendant
can obtain cQpies. In New York, only a
district attorney or a judge may see them.
Supreme Court Justice Brennan is of the
opinion that pre-trial disclosure of defendant's statements is not a privilege "but
his absolute right, "22 and the Massachussetts Court held in Commonwealth V. Stepper that the accused is deprived of due
process if he is not permitted or afforded
"all legitimate means to present his case
fairly to the tribunal . . . we would remove any obstacle to a fair trial before the
trial, rather than have it remQved later and
double the expense of difficult and protracted proceedings.V'" However, the United
States Supreme Court held in Cicenia V.
Lagay (1957) "AlthQugh it is better practice for the prosecution to grant the accused's attorney pre-trial inspection of the
confession, the due process clause Qf the
FQurteenth Amendment
is nQt violated
when the accused in a state CQurt is denied
inspection Qf his Qwn cQnfessiQn priQr tQ
trial. "24
.
AdditiQnally, a discQvery measure fQr
,the defense WQuid be Qf great assistance
In the preparatiQn Qf the case because Qften
the accused is an unreliable SQurce Qf informatiQn. Defense disc'Qvery alsQ Qffers
advantages tQ the prQsecutiQn. The late AttQrney General ThQmas McBride Qf Pennsylvania, wrote Qf defense discQvery:
"Where cQunsel is informed of the real
strength Qf the cQmmQnwealth's case, he
is better enabled tQ give the prQper advice tQ his client and trials are shQrtened,
issues are met more fairly, guilty pleas are
very often made, particularly in hQmicide
cases, and the administra tiQn Qf justice
SPRING, 1966
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THOMAS MORE MEDAL
TO BE AWARDED

o

The ThQm~s More Medal will be presented to an outstanding alumnus, faculty
member or friend of Loyola Law SchQQI
at the Thomas More Award Breakfast to
be held on May 22. The Thomas More
Medal is presented by the Thomas More
Law SQciety Qn behalf Qf the students and
faculty Qf the law schQQI Qn the basis Qf
achievement in and service tQ the legal
prQfessiQn. The recipient is tQ be selected
by a five member panel Qf alumni whQse
affiliatiQn with LQyQla and PQsitiQn in the
Ieglif prQfessiQn equip them tQ make a selectiQn representative
Qf the QpiniQn Qf
the law schQQI cQmmunity as a whQle. At
the present time, members Qf the ThQmas
MQre Law Society· are cQnducting a PQll
Qf a crQSS sectiQn Qf the alumni tQ prepare
a list Qf names fQr the panel's cQnsideratiQri.
Past recipients of the award are HQn.
ThQmas P. White, ASSQc. Justice Cal. Supreme Crt. (1960), HQn. Lewis H. Burke,
then Presiding Judge of L.A. Sup'r. Crt.,
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now Assoc. Justice Cal. Sup. Crt. (1961),
Hon. Marshall F. McComb, Assoc. Justice Cal. Supreme
Crt. (1962),
Hon.
Howard Zieman, Judge Sup. Crt. (1963),
Hon. Otto Kaus, then Judge L.A. Sup'r Crt.,
now Justice Cal. Dist. Crt. of Appeal.
This will be the first year in which the
award is presented in the form of a medal,
and also the first in which the recipient
will be named by a panel of alumni. It is
intended that these procedures will be installed permanently, and that the Thomas
More Medal will ultimately complement
the Aggeler Award by recognizing the
achievement of an alumnus who in the
opinion of the law school community has
been outstanding.

In accordance with the tradition, the
Thomas More Medal will be presented at
a breakfast for alumni and students to be
held on Sunday, May 22, 1966. The affair
will convene at 10:00 a.m. and adjourn
at noon; the location will be announced
shortly.
A special Mass for those attending the
breakfast will be celebrated at Loyola High
School Chapel beginning at 9:00 a.m., anyone wishing to attend is welcome. The
Thomas More Law Society is hopeful That
interested alumni and students will plan
to attend this event. For further details,
phone 383-8521 or write to the society at
the school.

LOYOLA REGENT
HONORED AT DINNER
Educational, industrial, and civic leaders honored Rev. Joseph J. Donovan, S. J.,
Loyola University School of Law Regent,
at a dinner honoring his 75th birthday held
in the Grand Ballroom of the Beverly Hilton Hotel, Wednesday, Feb. 16, 1966 ..
Father Donovan, who has been associated
with the School of Law since 1927, has
been the guiding force in the development
of the School which has graduated more
than 500 attorneys into the legal profession
throughout California
and the Western
states.
Active cooperation
of leaders of the
Bench and Bar started Loyola's School of
Law on its way as a' contributing factor
in the educational development of the community. The late William Joseph Ford, its
first dean, assembled key legal figures of
the era to train professional aspirants in the
then young college.
It was not long before Loyola graduates
were represented in Congress, in the Legislatures of California, Arizona, and Nevada,
judges of the Municipal
and Superior
Courts, on the staff of the Attorney General of the State, the District Attorney and
Public Defender of Los Angeles County,
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and the City Attorney of Los Angeles and
neighboring municipalities.
The Law School moved to the downtown
area of Los Angeles, first to Third and
Broadway in 1929, and five years later to
a location on Grand Avenue. In 1930, it
offered a full-time day session and gradually introduced
other changes to keep
pace with its development.
A year and a half ago the School of
Law moved to its modern facility at 1440
West Ninth Street, Los Angeles.
The ·'late Joseph Scott, who succeeded
William Joseph Ford as dean in 1929, ,
became dean emeritus in 1934.
The dinner honoring the priest was organized by five alumni of the Law School:
Attorneys John Andersen, Robert Nibley,
Frank Gray, Michael Clemens, and Frank
Hourigan.
The major address was presented by attorney Herman Selvin, past president of
the Los Angeles County Bar Association.
California Supreme Court Judges Marshall McComb and Louis Burke presented
the Law School with an oil portrait of Fr.
Donovan.
LOYOLA DIGEST

ADDRESS DELIVERED BY HERMAN SELVIN
HONORING FATHER DONOVAN'S 75th BIRTHDAY
Having regard to the clerical habiliments of Father Donovan and the distinctive cast of his and my features, so clearly
revelatory of our respective origins, the
thought may have occurred to some of you
that to put me in this part of the program
was, Vatican II notwithstanding,
carrying
the ecumenical principle too far. But to
speak of that principle of and concerning
Father Donovan is not a matter for jesting,
for he is in his own proper person a splendid embodiment of the principle, as the
varied character of this congregation at- .
tests. Deeply imprinted upon those who are
here as upon the institution whose destinies
he has so long and ably guided, is the catholicity of his spirit, the universality of his
humanity. Under his leadership there have
been admitted to the faculty and the student body of the Law School of Loyola
University all who could qualify, regardless of class, creed or race.
And so it is that we meet tonight, not
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as Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile
-not
even as denizens of that wonderful
menagerie of collegiate symbology, Trojan
or Bruin, Indian or Golden Bear, Don or
Lion- but as members of a more exclusive
order, the Friendly Society of Loyal Donovani ans, For in his house, too, there are
many mansions.
It was over 40 years ago that Joseph
Jeremiah Donovan, after baccalaureate and
magisterial degrees at Gonzaga, and in the
course of theological and canon law studies
at the University of Innsbruck in Austria,
and a doctorate from Gregorian University,
was ordained a priest. It was nearly 40
years ago that he came to the law school
of the University we now know as Loyola.
The institution to which he then came and
the one over which he now presides had
little in common save the name, and even
that was not so in the beginning.
Statistics are seldom enlivening or even
enlightening. But these are-and
so I give
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Seated-Mr.
Justice Marshall McComb-Calif. Supreme Court; Father Donovan-S. J. rcegent; Mr. Justice Louis Burke-Calif.
Supreme Court.
Standing-Father
Casassa-President
Loyola University; Herman Selvin-Past
President
Los Angeles County Bar Association.

them to you. When Father Donovan came
to the Law School, it was one for evening
students only. It is now, as we all know,
an institution for those devoting their full
time to study of the law and thus in the
class of U.S.c. and U.C.L.A. here, Santa
Clara, S.F.U., Hastings, Stanford and Boalt
elsewhere in the State. It was then a school
with no real home of its own; now a school
with a physical plant at the least the equal
of, and superior to some of the seven I
have mentioned. It was then a school with
. a faculty of 26 part-time teachers, now one.
with 14 full and 20 part-time instructors.
It was then a school of 195 evening, but
no full-time students. In 1930 it had 15
day students, now it has 287 full-time and
243 part-time students. It had then no
library at all, now it has 65,000 volumes.
Then 9 of its students took the bar examinations and 5 passed-a
percentage of
55~h%. In the past three years, 159 of
its graduates have taken and 111, a percentage of 70%, passed that examination
-a percentage that puts it only a few points
below Hastings,
Il.S. c. , U.C.L.A.
and
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Stanford, and just a few more than that
below Boalt. [You may guess from the way
in which I have presented these last figures,
my own alma mater.]
It is, you will agree, not merely a coincidence that this great advance and
Father Donovan's administration
as Regent were coterminous. And so it is that
we take advantage of the fact that, like
ordinary mortals, he has annually a birthday, to pause and let him know that we too
know and are grateful.
It is not to be supposed from what' I
have said that the Law School-principal
and fruitful though it has been-has
been
his only preoccupation.
You will find in
Who's Who in America the fact noted that,
among other things, he is a member and
a one-time officer of the Irish History Society. Since the biographies published in
Who's Who are in fact autobiographical,
it
is a safe inference that Father Donovan
thought this fact important. That being so,
and the occasion being what it is, I should
never forgive myself if I did not take adLOYOLA DIGEST

vantage, I hope you will forgive me if I
do take advantage of the occasion for a
personal offering of my-I
should say our
own, as it was Mrs. Selvin's inspiration
to do this. She, as some of you may know,
is in nearly constant communication with
Shannon Airport, joyfully oblivious to the
fact that its being a free port means only
free of Irish, not American, import duties.
In any event, through her status as one of
Shannon's preferred mail-order customers,
I am able to present, and after these remarks will present to Father Donovan, a
reproduction of The Dublin Correspondent
for April 6, 1808; (the date is not sig-

And then turn it over to you to sing in
English, Happy Birthday to You, Dear
Father Donovan, Happy Biithday to you.

AN EXAMINATION OF
PROBATE CODE 41

from the Magna Carta
(Rollisons on Wills.)

By Joseph Reynolds"
California has long been considered a
frontier of legislative innovation and development. Indeed, critics have often complained that the Legislators, iri their attempt
to be progressive and flexible, have too
quickly abandoned
the established
and
tested ways.
For better or worse, the policy of the
State Lawmakers has always been to meet
the ever changing needs of the people with
reform and invention. The irony of Section 41 of the Probate Code is that, in a
bastion of legislative foresightedness,
the
. law is throttled with an archaic and inequitable refuge from -the Middle Ages.
Probate Code 41 is entitled, "Restrictions: Passage of property contrary to law."
Basically it has two parts .. The first prohibits passage of any property devised to
a charity by a will, executed within thirty
days of the testator's death. The second
limits such devises to one third of the estate, if the will is executed within six
months of the testator's death.
This type of statute is generally grouped
within the so-called "Mortmain Statutes."
Just when the "Statutes
of Mortmain"
were enacted depends upon the preference
of writers, but they are commonly dated
SPRING, 1966 "

nificant-that
was the available issue) ; and
a reproduction, printed from the original
type, of the Proclamation that began the
Easter Uprising of 1916 in Dublin, "The
Troubles" as ever were.
But these are only a side issue. In case
some of you were beginning to doubt, this
is our not just my party. And so, in all of
our behalfs let me say, begging the Father's
absolution for what I am sure must be a
perfectly atrocious Gaelic pronunciation:

LAW

BREH-EH

SUNNAH

CHEEV.

to 9 George

II.

The heart of the Mortmain Statutes was
not the improvident gifts of testators, but
the struggle between the Church and the
State. Certainly the greatest single impetus
of any series of these acts was the conflict
between Henry VIII and the Pope.
With the demise of the influence of the
Church in, England, the original motive for
these Statutes has disappeared.
Nevertheless, they form such an integral part of
the mainstream of the Common Law, that
all fifty States, as well as common law
jurisdictions
other than England,
have
variations of one type or another.
In 1874, the California legislature enacted Civil Code 1313 (later Probate Code
41) restricting charitable bequests. AIthough grounded in a struggle between a
jealous king and a corrupt church, the
California courts rationalized the Law in
this manner: "The Statute recognizes the
validity of charitable gifts, but imposes
restrictions to prevent improvident gifts by
will to charity to the disherison of lawful
heirs, similar to the Mortmain Act of 9
George II." (Hinckley Estate 58 C. 457)

(1881).
Or, as was said in Lennon Estate (1907)
the reason
for the law is so that man's fears of super-

(52 C. 3'27) (92 P. 870), " ...
':'Student

Loyola taw School.
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stition, or his deathbed hope of purchasing
a blissful immortality, shall not be allowed
to influence the disposition which he may
make of his property, to the injury of his
heirs. "
However, this legislative control of one's
right to beque a property as one sees fit,
does not always serve the testator as might
be thought. Although there will always be
cases of an over zealous cleric or perhaps
an unscrupulous "minister" who will play
upon the dying person's hope for "salvation" to the detriment of his heirs, these
will be the isolated cases.
The average man of today is not as
easily persuaded or intimidated by pressure
or signs as he was during the centuries of
the Church's domination in England; nor
for that matter, one hundred or even fifty
years ago. In any event, an heir may always contest a will because of undue influence, and the behind-the-scene's activity
of some "charities" have repeatedly been
disposed of on just that ground.
A more realistic evaluation of the eHect
of Probate Code 41 is this: rather than
"protecting"
the decedent from foolishly
squandering his estate in a vain attempt
to buy a grace, it gives a complete windfall to one whose only claim is an accident
of blood.
Hence, we have the heir at law (defined
by the section). This entitles one who,
during the life of the testator, may have
been indiHerent or even antagonistic toward
him, to receive a percentage of the decedent's estate.
, This legacy is possible despite the testator's clearly defined intentions to the contrary, and comes about only by an arbitrary
right granted by the legislature.
In Estate of Haines, 76 Cal. Ap. 2d.
673, the court allowed a testator to bypass
the thirty day clause of Probate Code 41
by means of a substitutional clause.
Justice Peek speaking for the court held
that, " ...
it may be stated that generally
speaking, a testamentary gift to charity is
valid, even though made within thirty days
of the testator's death; however, such a gift
may, nevertheless, be avoided at the instance of an aggrieved heir of a designated.
5k1

class, but such heir is not aggrieved unless
he would have been entitled to take property had it not been willed to charity, as
in a case where the will provides an alternative disposition to one other than the
heir." (Page 679).
In other words, unless an heir at law
would take "but for" the charitable bequest, there is no effect to Section 41.
In an unanimous opinion, the California
Supreme Court cited with approval the
Haines Case. In Estate of Sanderson, (5,8
C. 2d. 522,527)
(25 Cal. Rptr. 69), it
was held that, "under the terms of Section
41, a relative of the enumerated class may
avoid a charitable legacy or devise only
if, and to the extent he would have taken
the property but for such legacy or devise;
where there is an otherwise' effective disposition in the will of the portion of the
estate represented by the charitable gifts,
the claims of the relatives are ineffectual."
Hence, by an alternative clause in favour
of a Bishop, (it was Bishop Bundy in the
Sanderson Case) or some other stranger in
blood, (Davis, intra) a competent lawyer'
or a knowledgeable individual can effectively by-pass Probate Code 41.
, The anomaly of this state of the law is
that in a jurisdiction which allows an individual to dispose of property by a holographic will (Probate
Code 58), and
where, "gifts for charitable purposes are
highly favoured, an bequests of such kind
will be liberally contrued to accomplish
the intent of the donor," (Estate of Davidson, 96 Cal. App. 2d. 264, at 270), such
a trap for the unwary and unskilled should
continue to exist.
,
To be sure, an analysis of the code and
a review of the cases will enable one to
avoid the effect of this Section.
The difficulty is this: the law is allegedly designed to protect the "improvident" and "superstitious",
and it is not
likely that these.people will understand the
intricacies of effective Probate.
'
On the contrary, it is this class of people
who write a fully valid holographic will to
the effect that, "I leave five dollars to my
brother, Harry, who will be glad that 'I
(Continued on page 68)
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May we recommend our expert service.in handling
and expediting of accounts for
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REQUIREMENT SAND
OUTPUT CONTRACTS IN
CALIFORNIA UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE
By Mitchel J. Ezer*
Generally speaking, requirements
and
output contracts are long-term arrangements envisaging performance by installment deliveries over a period of months or
years in which it is commercially infeasible
to specify numerical amounts. Quantity is
therefore expressed in terms of the buyers
ability to purchase or the seller's capacity
to produce.
REQUIREMENTS

CONTRACTS

Probably the more important of these
two "open quantity" arrangements is the
one which measures goods in terms of the
buyer's needs. From the seller's standpoint,
such contracts are advantageous in that the
assured-demand
produces savings in marketing, advertising, storage, transportation
and credit costs besides facilitating production scheduling; to the buyer, a requirements contract means an assured source
of supply without the need to predict production demands, as well as price advantages, purchasing
economies and, sometimes, standarization
of equipment
and
financial and technical assistance. 1 A requirements contract can be for a fixed term,
or of indefinite duration; in the latter case,
the agreement is binding so long as the
buyer has requirements.f Requirements can
be measured by a specific factory, 3 or by
a given job," or for a specific area. G
Legally, such arrangements present two
basic problems. First, whether they are
sufficiently
certain to be valid and enforceable. Second, the liability of the parties when the buyer's requirements either
expand, contract or disappear. It has been
universally assumed by every Code commentator who has dealt with the subject
that section 2306 (1) -the
requirements
*Member
California
Bar,Lecturer
University School of Law.
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and output contract proviso-grapples
with
both problems. This writer must challenge
that presumption. Nothing in the text of Section 2306 (1) validates requirements contracts; rather, it seems to presume that their
validity is established. That the draftsman
intended to validate them seems clear from
his comments," but it is submitted that his
singularly inept text has failed to accomplish its purpose. Only the second problem
is actually treated by the statute, and therefore the issue of initial validity must be
dealt with as a common law question under
the Code's "savings clause. "7
Validity
Nowhere in the law of contracts are
semantics as important as they are in this
area. If the quantity clause is expressed
in terms of all that the buyer "will take"
Of "demand" or "wishes" or "wants" 'Or
"desires" it is denominated illusory, anti
t6e agreement in which the phrase is included is labelled as lacking in mutuality
and insufficient to constitute a contract. R
. Some courts say a "will, wish or want"
agreement is VOId from its inceptior. D
Others regard them as a continuing offer
from the seller to sell as much as the
buyer wishes or wants, converted into a
contract for the quantity ordered each time
the buyer places an order."? Should the
felicitous
phrase
"requirements"
or
"needs" be used, however, the validity incantation
is immediately
pronounced."
Then, the contract is deemed to impose
mutually binding obligations, for not only
is the seller" required to sell but the buyer
_ is obliged to purchase so long as he has
requirements.P
Having surrendered
his'
right to purchase elsewhere, which legally
is a detriment, the buyer is deemed to have
given sufficient consideration to .support a
bilateral contract.l" .
Such an analysis, standard though it is,
leaves much to be desired. It is too formalistic, leaving too 'much hinging on a mere
choice of words. Enforceability of complex
business a:r:rangements is determined by
rote application of such commercially unfamiliar concepts as "illusory bargain,"
"consideration"
and "mutuality," triggered
LOYOLA DIGEST

by the use of a phrase which the parties
probably regarded in an entirely different
light than that in which it is cast by the
courts. If the accepted framework is no!
to be discarded entirely for a standard
based on intent, as the Code does with
open price contracts, then more discerning analytical tools are needed. Mere use
of phrases such as "wish" or "want"
should not automatically produce a pronouncement that the understanding is void
or only a continuing offer to sell. First,
the phrasing itself should be examined.
Has the buyer agreed to purchase "whatever" he wants or "all" that he wants? If
the latter, it can be read as obligating the
buyer to buy all that he wants from the
seller, or all that he wants of the commodity. Reading it as an obligation to buy
all that he wants of the commodity, which
is a reasonable construction, the conclusion is reached that the buyer has surrendered the right to buy elsewhere.v' An "all
wanted" agreement, when this construed is
so similar to a "needs" arrangement that
its validity should not really be questioned.
Where the buyer has agreed only to take
"whatever" he wants, still the rule of automatic inval'idity should be discarded. The
buyer, had he been sufficiently sophisticated, could have made such a contract
valid by giving the seller a peppercorn
(whatever that may be), or by agreeing to
make' a present purchase in consideration
of the seller's promise to sell whatever
the buyer may want in the future. Clearly,
his failure to follow this formal'istic legal
procedure should not produce the dire result of automatic invalidity. A buyer who
has agreed to purchase whatever he wants
at a fixed or determinable price must be
deemed to have promised not to order unless willing to pay that price, which in turn
should be regarded as sufficient legal detriment to constitute consideration.I" To the
argument that such a rule would permit the
enforcement of "uncertain" contracts there
is the answer that if formal consideration
such as the mystical peppercorn had been
given, the courts would have had to enforce
the agreement based on some objective determination of the buyer's wants, and to
SPRING, 1966

declare the agreement invalid because formalities were not observed is a coward's
way of avoiding the struggle. Unless there
are other reasons for invalidating it, such
as the buyer's attempt to exploit a favorable agreement, wants should be deemed
and enforced as the equivalent of needs.l''
.To the contention that a wants contract is
inherently unfair because the seller is at
the buyer's mercy, there is the reply that
mere potential for unfairness is not sufficient grounds for invalidity."? Under the
Code, each party to any commercial agreement is expected to act in good faith. I S
Therefore, .if the buyer is using the wants
contract only to fill his current needs, invalidity due to prospective unconscionability should not result.l" Only the buyer's
exploitation of the seller should be deemed
grounds for negating the contract, and even
then if the buyer's exercise of capricious
power can be curbed by reading into the
wants agreement a "normal wants" standard that should be done in lieu of invalidation.P"
The Established-Nonestablished
Business
Distinction: It has been held that a requirements contract is valid only if the buyer
has an established business." A needs arrangement e~tered into by a nonestablished
firm, even if the right language is used,
is deemed in mutuality since the buyer's
requirements at the time of formation are
nonexistent. 22 This rationale runs counter
to economic reality, for a requirements contract is most useful to the nonestablished
business; the established enterprise, whose
numerical quantity needs are reasonably
predictable, has far less use for such an
arrangement."
It is submitted, therefore,
that declaring such a greements invalid is
unwarranted.
The seller has entered the
arrangement
voluntarily,
hoping to gain
the benefit of increased patronage. Since his
is a voluntary act which has created an
expectation interest for the buyer, that expectancy should be protected unless the
buyer is exploiting the seller.r" The requisite' consideration for the seller's promise
to self can be found in the buyer's promise,
express or implied, to go into business unless he finds himself unable to do so de57

spite a good faith attempt at entry.:" Or,
the contract can be construed as making
the buyer's entry into business before the
first scheduled delivery date an implied
condition precedent to the seller's obligation to deliver.i" Under either theory, validity should be found.
The real issue enveloping these agreements should not be their val'idity but,
rather, how to ascertain damages in the
event the seller fails to deliver or the
buyer fails to establish his enterprise.
Under Section 2306 (1),
quantity
(on
which a damage measurement
must be
based) is tied to any stated estimate in
the contract, or if there is none to "any
normal or otherwise comparable prior ...
requirements."
Assuming
the nonestahlished business does not contractually estimate its requirements,
the question becomes how to determine "normal or otherwise comparable requirements."
The language itself suggests a solution. There is
nothing forbidding the use of evidence of
the normal or comparable prior requirements of third parties, and Professor Honnold, probably the foremost living authority on the law of sales, has suggested that
in the case of the nonestablished business
this would be an acceptable means of determining what requirements would have
heen.?" Counsel should of course also seek
any objective indicia of the proposed size
of the buyer's firm, but the third party
standard seems by far the most facile solution to this difficult problem.
In the nonestablished
business context,
there is also the question of the length
of time afforded the buyer to go into business, assuming of course the contract does
not cover that point. How long, in other
words, must the seller wait before he is'
free to contract for disposition of his production to other sources? The Code does
not provide an answer, but it does provide machinery for obtaining an answer.
Section 2609 permits a party who has reasonable grounds for believing himself insecure to demand adequate assurances of performance from the other party, If such
are not seasonably forthcoming, the aggrieved party is allowed to treat the contract
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as breached. A requirements seller faced
with the problem of a buyer delaying the
establishment of the enterprise can resort to
Section 2609, thereby forcing the buyer into
committing' himself to a specific date for
the opening of his establishment.

The Changing Requirements Problem
Brevity, Shakespeare tells us, is the soul
of wit. If that be so, then gales of unrestrained laughter are in order upon reading Section 2306 (1), for if it is anything
it is abbreviated. Terseness, however, is not
always a virtue in drafting statutes, as Section 2306 (1) so aptly illustrates. For in
attempting' to resolve the highly complex
problem of what to do in the event the
buyer's requirements expand, contract or
evaporate, that" section states only that
"A term which measures the quantity
by
the output of the seller or the requirements
of the buyer means such actual output or
requirements as may occur in good faith,
except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to one stated estimate or in
the absence of a stated estimate to any
normal or otherwise comparable prior out-,
put or requirements may be tendered 01'
demanded." (Emphasis added.)
Problem piles upon problem as this section is dissected. First, there arises a serious
question about the relationship of the words
requirements " on t he one
" output "d'"an
hand to "tendered"
and 'demanded"
on
the other. Does "output"
relate only to
"tendered"
and "requirements"
to "demanded," or is cross-ruffing permissible?
The section could be read as stating that
although finder any .output contract no
quantity unreasonably disproportionate
to
any estimate or prior output may be tendered by the seller, nevertheless the buyer
is not debarred from demanding a disparate
quantity; while, conversely, in a requirements contract no quantity unreasonably
disproportionate
may be demanded by the
buyer but the seller has not been forbidden from tendering such an amount. Or .
Section 2306 (1) can be interpreted as providing that under either an output or requirements contract no unreasonably
disproportionate quantity may be tendered by
the seller or demanded by the buyer. SeLOYOLA DIGEST

mantic metaphysics? Let us see if it is. If
the interpretation
forbidding cross-ruffing
is accepted, and it is a reasonable one, the
difficulties which can arise are practical in
the extreme. To illustrate, assume the following fact situation. The buyer has agreed
to purchase his requirements of a certain
unit from the seller for $2.00 each; normal requirements established by a course
of dealing or performance is 100,000 units
per year; and a reasonably proportionate
variation is 25ifo (25,000 units). Buyer's
needs rise to 200,000 units per year, while
the market price falls to $1.50 per unit.
Buyer, wishing to adhere to his contract,
is willing to accept 125,000 units per year
from seller at $'2.00 per unit, but since
under Section 2306 (1) he cannot demand
more than 125,000 units from the seller he
wishes to purchase the other 75,000 which
he needs in the market at $1.50 apiece.
Under the circumstances,
can the seller
tender 200,000 units to the buyer at $2.00
each and insist that the buyer accept them,
or does Section 2306 (1) not only prevent
the buyer from demanding more than 125,000 units but also preclude the, seller from
tendering more than that amount. If the
seller were free to and did tender 200,000
units, the buyer could not readily claim
the seller was acting in bad faith; requirements was the contract standard, and requirements is what the seller is tendering,
eventhough, because of Section 2306(1)'s
"unreasonably
disproportionate
quantity"
rule the buyer could not compel the seller
to tender more than 125,000 units if, say,
the market price had risen to $2.50 per
unit and the seller was totally uninterested
in fulfilling more than his minimal contract obligations.
Construing Section 2306 (11 as curbing
only the requirements' buyer but not the
requirements
seller creates still further
problems. If the buyer can demand only
a reasonably proportionate variance, but the
seller can if he chooses (but is not required to) tender all of the buyer's requirements, seemingly the buyer would be in
breach if he purchased his needs over and
above a reasonably proportionate increase
from another source before the time schedSPRING, 1966
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uled for the seller's performance. The buyer would have to wait and see how large
a quantity the seller would tender, doing
nothing to protect himself from a materials
stoppage, for a precipitate outside contract
would be deemed a breach if the seller
elected to deliver the buyer's total requirements. In sum, it is submitted that in the
interest of fairness to buyers, Section
2306 (1) should be construed as limiting
the seller's right of tender as well as the
buyer's right of demand under a requirements contract. Even this construction would
leave the parties with the miserable problem of determining what is an "unreasonably disproportionate
quantity,"
but at
least it would avoid statutory sanctioning
of unconscionable exploitations along the
lines described above.
Another linguistic stumbling block in
Section 2'306 (1) is the meaning of "normal or otherwise comparable
prior requirements." What is normalcy? Comparable to what? Does this language mean that
the test is buyer's requirements at the time
the contract is formed, or on the basis of the
amount included in the preceding delivery,
or the amount delivered during the preceding month or year, or an average based
on a year's or two years' deliveries, or
what? For example, assume that on January
1, when the requirements contract is executed, the buyer's requirements are 100,000
units per week, but thereafter they start increasing at a steady rate of 500 units per
week. Each week's delivery is not unreasonably disproportionate
to its immediate
predecessor, but by the time a few months
have' elapsed the weekly deliveries are
grossly disparate to the requirements at the
time of formation, and are substantially out
of line with the total delivered during the
earlier months. Precisely such problems as
this will be created by artificial demand
stimuli such as a war, or depressants, such
as a recession.
The only case in point holds that
when demand is rapidly expanding or
contracting
due to artificial
conditions,
the seller is required to supply only an
amount comparable to that being delivered
at the time the contract was formed.23
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Nothing in Section 2306 (1) suggests what
the "normalcy"
base is to be, or against
what the "comparison"
is supposed to be
made. It is suggested, therefore, that rather
than attempt to resolve the problem by torturing that obscure provision, reference instead be made to Commercial Code Section
2615 dealing with the doctrine of commercial frustration. In employing Section
2615, the theory would be that the occurence of the artificial demand factor was a
contingency the nonoccurrence of which was
basic to the contract, so that the seller is
excused from delivering more than the buyer's requirements before the artificial factor was introduced. In other words, it would
be unnecessary to fix normalcy or comparability as requirements at the time of formation, as in Jenkins, but rather normalcy or
comparability would be the amount that was
being delivered before the artificial factor
-such
as a war or stock market collapse
-intervened
to cause demand to soar or
plummet.
Expanding Requirements
Business Expansion: One reason for an
increase in the buyer's requirements is an
expansion of his business. Whether he will
be able to compel the seller to fill his
increased needs depends largely on the
reason underlying the expansion. If it is
a product of normal business growth, then
beyond question the seller will be responsible for delivering the increased quantities.29 This would 'be requirements which
"occur
in good faith"
under Section
2306 (1), and in a normal growth situ a'tion successive deliveries will rarely if ever
be unreasonably disproportionate
to those
made in the immediate past. Expansion
may also be caused by the general market taking a sharp inflationary
upswing.
Here, the problems become more abstruse
and harder to solve. If the price is not tied
to some market standard, but is fixed, a
ballooning market will obviously enable the
buyer to reap an advantage at the seller's
expense, for his ability to buy materials
at a price lower than that prevailing generally will permit him to undersell, his
competitors, thereby increasing his business
60

,and concomitantly his' requirements.
His
actions under the circumstances will largely
determine the extent to which his contract
will be enforced. Should sudden expansion
be motivated by the buyer's advantaging
himself under a favorable contract, a "good
faith" or "normal requirements" standard
will be invoked to curb his aggressive tendencies should he resort to law to compel
the seller to comply with his exorbitant demands."? However, if the expansion was
reasonably forseeable despite the favorable
contract, then the buyer should not be penalized for expanding even though he is in
part motivated by his advantageous agreement. 31 Similarly, if his expansion under
pressures of an uptrending market is no
greater than that being undertaken by his
competitors, again his demand for increased
requirements
should be judicially
en-

forced.i"
The J obber-M anufacturer Distinction: Ii
market price rises, a manufacturer holding
a favorable requirements contract will not
automatically expand his production. The
agreement then affords him only lower
material costs; he must still expand his
plant, increase his labor force and obtain
the various overhead elements attendant
upon expansion. A middleman, however,
is in a position to increase his sales substantially if the market prices rise even
slightly above that stipulated by his requirements contract; he resells what he buys intact, and if he' can price his goods lower
than that of his competitors (because of
his favorable needs contract) he obviously
will enjoy huge volume increase at his seller's expense. For that reason, some courts
have refused to enforce requirements contracts where the buyer is a jobber rather
than a manufacturer, allegedly because the
jobber has no physical plant against which
to measure the unfilled needs.t" This rule
will be changed by the Code. Section
2306 (1) refers to "buyers," elsewhere defined to include any person purchasing
goods." And the comments, specifically
note that the requirements contract section
is intended to apply to nonproducing establishments as well as manufacturing
conoerns.I" The middleman, like the manufacLOYOLA DIGEST

turer, is under a good faith interdiction not
to speculate at the seller's expense should
the agreement prove beneficial. If the jobbing buyer acts in good faith, he is entitled to judicial protection; when his conauct is maleficient, he has violated the
Code's commands and his excesses can and
should be curbed, although the contract itself should be recognized as valid.i'''
In a jobber requirements contract, the
real problem is how to compute damages
should the seller breach. When an estimate
is stated in the contract, as it should be if
counsel rather than the parties has drawn
it, the requirements
base is established
under the explicit provisions of Section
2306 (1). If no estimate is stated but the
jobber has a history of requirements,
a
past experience basis can be used in calculating damages. If, however, he is a nonestablished middleman, there will not even
be available a prospective enterprise size
on which to base an estimate of probable
requirements.
Clever
counsel, .though,
should be able to produce some evidence
-such
as capitalization
of the business,
size of rented premises, or a listing of prospective clientel-e-on which some notion of
at least minimal requirements
can be
founded. And, as has already been noted,
the normal requirements of third parties
can and should be used.37

tion motivated solely by a desire to escape
an unfavorable contract.:" Similarly, the
Code comments indicate that reduction to
curtail losses would not be permissible.P"
Neither conclusion seems acceptable. Under
the Code, the Mandate that actions be taken
in good faith permeates and supersedes
every other provision.t" Good faith means
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned, and in the case of merchants;"
which requirements
buyers invariably are, good faith also means observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.t" To argue
that a buyer who reduces or eliminates his
requirements in order to curtail losses is
not acting in good faith is to deny reality.
He is acting honestly in fact, and observing reasonable commercial standards of
any trade, for no mercantile calling thrusts
on anyone an altruistic responsibility to become bankrupt merely to sustain an unfavorable contract from which there is an
escape. Professor Gilmore stated the proposition as well as it has ever been put when
he said
The .'attempt by B to see that S goes
bankrupt
instead
of himself may be
thought to be an a::tion taken entirely
in commercial good faith ... I see no convincing reason why buyers as a class, instead of sellers as a class, should end up
in bankruptcy."·i3

Decreasing and Disappearing Requirements
Reduced
Requirements:
On the one
hand, Section 2306 (1) announces that a
buyer's requirements are those which actually occur in good faith; on the other,
that a quantity unreasonably disproportionate to a stated estimate or established norm
may not be demanded. What happens, then,
if due to an unfavorable contract the buyer in complete good faith radically reduces
his requirements? Does the fact that he has
acted in good faith control over the fact
that he is now demanding an quantity unreasonably disproportionate to the norm, or
is his radical reduction in requirements,
albeit in good faith, a breach because it
is unreasonably
disproportionate.
It has
been suggested that a breach can be committed by a dramatic requirements reduc-_

It is submitted, therefore, that the most
sensible reading of Section 2306 (1) is that
a buyer is permitted to reduce his requirements disproportionately,
providing his action is taken in good faith, which includes
among other things the prevention of loss
to himself."
Observe, though, that if the
buyer does demand a disproportionately
reduced quantity and the seller then refuses to deliver, it should not be deemed
a breach by the seller.
Abandoning
or
Selling
Business:
Whether a buyer operating under a requirements contract can sell or abandon his
business without incurring liability to the
seller is a question to be resolved outside
the 'Code; the draftsman specifically disclaims any intent to deal with the problem:45 One article reports that the tendency
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of the cases has been to impose liability for
sale or abandonment
on one of three
theories: An implied promise to take normal requirements;
lack of good faith; or
a judicially imposed obligation requiring
the buyer to remain in business.t" Two
other commentators state that the weight
of authority holds the buyer need not stay
in business and have requirements;
if he
quits in good faith, it is not a breach of
contract."? California has a number of relevant decisions, though only one, Langenburg v. Guy/8 is a requirements contract
case and thus squarely in point; the rest involve output arrangements.t'' Langenburg,
in line with the output contract cases, hold
that a requirements contract does not impose upon the buyer any duty not to sell
his business, and that if he "sells his business and thus reduces his requirements to
the vanishing point he does not thereby
breach his contract."
One article states that if sale or abandonment was totally or largely motivated by
an unfavorable requirements contract the
buyer should be liable for damages to the
seller. 50 If abandonment or sale under such
circumstances is deemed an act of bad faith,
then their conclusion seems correct, but as
has been noted'" there is nothing morally
wrong about a businessman seeking a legitimate escape from an unfavorable
deal,
providing there are no other factors indicating liability should be imposed. If, for
instance, the buyer reorganizes his enterprise in different guise to avoid a bad contract there would be clear bad faith and
Iiability could and should be imposed.
"Similarly, if the seller has expanded his plant capacity in order to meet the buyer's
anticipated orders, knowing abandonment
or sale by the buyer of his business could
well be deemed vis-a-vis the seller, warranting imposition of Iiabi lity. But if the seller
will not be seriously injured and the buyer
has in fact totally abandoned or sold his
business in good faith in order to avoid
loss, such abandonment or sale should be
damage free.
If the business is sold, whether the new
owner can assume the rights and duties
under the requirements
contract depends
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"on whether the original agreement was dependent on the peculiar skill and judgment
of the party who has sold his business. Generally,where
a mere sale of goods is involved, it IS held that anyone can deliver
or receive the product, and that the contract can be conveyed with the business. 52
Insofar as the Code is concerned, the only
relevant point is that a sale by itself is not
deemed sufficient grounds for a sudden expansion or reduction of requirements.F"
Availability of Substitutes: It sometimes
happens that after a requirements contract
is formed, a cheaper or more efficient
product will appear on the market which
the buyer can use in place of the goods
covered by his needs agreement. Is he
then free to terminate purchases under this
contract with the seller on grounds that
the advent of a substitute has reduced or
eliminated his previous requirements? This
is the same problem, with another face, as
the abandonment or sale of business issue.
Use of a legitimate substitute is an action
taken in good faith. 54 Therefore, if good
faith rather than unreasonably disproportionate quantity is the controlling standard
under Section 2'306 (1),55 the buyer's action
should be sanctioned. If, however, he is
absolutely bound for the term of the contract not to reduce his requirements disproportionately,
irrespective of good faith,
then his liability to purchase substitutes
will be correspondingly limited. In an economy dedicated to principles of "free enterprise" and the "benefits of competition,"
the latter interpretation hardly seems supportable.
The Effect

of Estimates

'

At common law, it was held that if any
estimated quantity was specified in a requirements contract it would be ignored in
favor of actual requirements. 56 This rule
is changed by the Code. An estimated quantity used in a contract is employed by Section 2306 (1) as a base against which variations in demand or supply can be measured
to 'determine whether quantities demanded
or delivered are becoming "unreasonably
disproportionate. "57
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ments would have been in order to, recover,"? which can sometimes be an aggravating problem. Two basic types of evidence are admitted: Buyer's average prebreach purchases over a substantial period
of time, or buyer's actual market purchases
during the balance of the contract term
following breacli." If, however, the contract
specifies a minimum quantity, then even absent proof of actual requirements the buyer will be liable for not not having taken
the accepted minimum, or the seller will
be liable for not having delivered it, as
the case may be.69

M aximum-M inimum. Contracts
Occasionally,
requirements
contracts
specify a maximum
and/or
mmimum
quantity. It is then held that the buyer is
obligated to purchase at least the minimum quantity, whether or not he has need
for it.58 Conversely, the contractual ceiling is viewed as a limit on the amount the
seller can tender or the buyer can demand.
Actual quantity, of course, depends on the
buyer's requirements,
but they must remain within the stated variations.P" No
comparable rules are found in the text of
Section 2306 (1), although the comments
specifically
indicate that maximums or
minimums specified in the contract set the
degree of elasticity for purposes of determining whether a quantity is "unreasonably
disproportionate. "60
Breach and Related Problems
Decisional law indicates a number of
ways in which a requirements contract can
be breached. Foremost, of course, is the
buyer making purchases from someone
other than the requirements seller.:" Outside purchases include not only acquisitions of the commodity itself, but also, purchase of a source of supply for the product which has the, effect of reducing the
buyer's former requirements.V Other methods of breach have, been indicated in the
preceding discuss'ion, such as, under certain
circumstances, abandonment or sale of the
buyer's business.i" or increasing'" or reducing'" requirements
disproportionately
.for unconscionable reasons. Finally, breach
can occur by "bunching,"
i.e. some requirements contracts do not obligate the
buyer to take 100% of his needs, but
specify the percentage of the whole which
he must purchase during the term of the
contract-s-if he attempts to telescope his
orders toward anyone part of the contract
term, purchasing his entire requirements
elsewhere for the remainder of the contract
period, this is deemed to be a breach; percentage of requirements means that percentage as it occurs during the ordinary
course of business.I"
Once breach has been established, the
aggrieved party must prove what require-'"
SPRING,
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OUTPUT

CONTRACTS

Output contracts are those in which the
quantity measure is expressed in terms of
all or a given percentage of the seller's
total production. Output agreements are the
other side of requirement contracts coin,
and the legal problems presented are in
many instances identical with those discussed in connection with needs arrangements. For that reason, the discussion herein will be abbreviated, and reference made
to the requirements contract analysis for full
exploration of the ramifications of output
agreements under both the common law and
the Code.

<

Validity
As was the case with requirements contracts, semantics have, and because of Code
silence on the point, will continue to playa
large role in determining the validity of
output arrangements.
If the quantity is
stated to be "all" or a percentage of the
seIter's total output from a given orchard,
farm, factory or other producing unit, the
courts unhesitatingly declare the arrangement valid."" So long as the seller is producing, he is under a binding legal obligation to sell to the buyer and to no one else;
hence, there is sufficient mutuality of obligation. When" however, the phrasing is
not as polished-as,
for instance when the
seller's duty is expressed in terms of all
he "will deliver"-the
agreement is deemed
illusory and void for want of mutuality. i1
Here, as with requirements
contracts,
more, discerning analysis is needed. Mere
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use of a phrase which a facile mind can
construe as creating an illusory obligation
should not be so interpreted where the intent of the parties to form a binding agreement is manifest. 72
The Changing Output Problem
Section 2306 (1) grapples with the problems of a changing output situation, using
the same murky language which it employs
on requirements
contracts. Certain problems of statutory construction arise from
the text of the statute itself. First, the relationship between the words' "output or requirements" on the one hand and "tendered
or demanded" on the other, already discussed from a requirements contract standpoint earlier in this article." From the output contracts viewpoint, if the word "output" relates only to the word "tendered,"
the seller would be limited to tendering to
the buyer only a reasonably proportionate
increase in his output, while the buyer
would be free to demand any output increase if it suited his interest, but could
decline requesting
any disproportionate
quantity if it did not. For instance, assume
that seller has agreed to market his output
of a given unit for $2.00 each to buyer;
that seller's normal output established by
course of dealing is 100,000 units per year;
and a reasonably proportionate
variation
is 25% (25,000)
units. Seller's output
rises to 250,000 units as market price increases to $2.50 per unit. Seller, albeit uneager to adhere to his contract, is willing
to tender 125,000 units per year at $2.00
per unit; but since under Section 2306 (1 )
he clearly cannot validly tender-compel
the buyer to takemore than 125,000
units, he wishes to sell the other 125,000
in the market at the higher $2.50 price.
The question then becomes, can the buyer
demand that the seller deliver all 250,000
units at $2.00 each, or does Section
2306 (1) not only prevent the seller from
tendering more than 125,000 units but also
preclude the buyer from demanding more
than that amount? If the market had fallen
to $1.50 per unit, the buyer beyond question would be grudgingly accepting only
the minimum number the seller can com64

pel him to take (125,000),
and Section
2306 (1) would forbid the seller from tendering any amount in excess of that quantity. Hence, from a mutuality standpoint,
it would seem that Section 2306 (1) should
be interpreted as limiting the buyer's right
to demand an unreasonably disproportionate quantity as well as the seller's right to
tender such in an output situation.
Another linguistic problem in Section
2306 (1) relates to the phrase "normal or
otherwise comparable output," the question
being what constitutes the normalcy or
comparability standard. This has been previously discussed herein from the requirements contract viewpoint."
and that discussion is fully applicable here.
Expanding

Output

One reason for an increase in the seller's
production is an expansion of his business.
Whether he will be able to force the output
buyer to take the product increase depends
primarily on the reasons underlying the expansion. The discussion with respect to expansion in requirement contracts context is
applicable here.?"
Decreasing and Disappearing

Output

Output Reduction: The "requirements reduction" analysis is of equal force here,
and reference is therefore made to that
discussion.?"
Sale of Business: A fairly substantial
body of law has developed in California
on whether an output seller is free to sell
his business, thereby eliminating his output, and thus walk away from his contract
without liability to his buyer. Generally,
it is held that sale of a business is not
a breach.?? In Pratt Low Preserving Co. v.
Euans.!" the court remarked that sale of
business per se does not breach an output
contract, but then held that where, as there,
the output contract contained words of present sale ("hereby sells") rather than a
phrase indicating future sale ("agrees to
sell") title to the goods was vested in the
buyer at the time of sale even though the
goods were not then in ease, and the seller
LOYOLA DIGEST

must therefore respond in damages for failing to deliver. The decision hardly detracts from the rule that sale of a business
is not a breach of an output contract, for
it pays obseisance to the general rule in
dicta, it relies heavily on the concept of
"title" rendered obsolete by the Code,79
and its rationale evolves from the now discredited doctrine of potential possession.
Only the case of Karales v. Los Angeles
Creamery CO.,80 can be truly said to hold
that a seller may not disable himself from
performing an output contract by selling the
producing unit, and Karales must be regarded as having been overruled sub silentio by later contradictory decisions.V
Urrder Section 2306( 1), the question
will be whether the language obligating
the seller to sell only "such actual output
as may occur in good faith" supersedes
the clause refusing to permit a tender "unreasonably disproportionate
to any stated
estimate or any normal or otherwise comparable prior output," or whether the reverse will be true. A seller who conveys
his business for a legitimate reason will
in complete good faith have no output, but
he will be tendering to his output buyer an
unreasonably
disproportionate
quantityzero. It is submitted that good faith should
be the controlling standard, since it is the
permeating
omnipresence
of the Code.82
Hence, a seller who sells or abandons his
business, or curtails production in order
to avoid loss, should generally not be held
to have breached his output contract.P" Only
where the seller knows that the buyer has
expended substantial monies in anticipating
of the seller's performance, or where the
seller is using the sale as a subterfuge to
reorganize his business without the burden
of the output agreement, should a breach
be declared-not
because an unreasonably
disproportionate quantity is being tendered,
but because under the circumstances the
seller is acting in bad faith.84

The Effect of Estimates
It has been held that if any estimated
quantity is stated in an output contract it
is to be ignored; the seller discharges his
obligation by tendering his output, however
SPRING, 1966

far that may deviate from the estimate.P"
California law is apparently altered by
Code enactment. Estimates now will be used
as a base in determining whether a seller
is tendering an unreasonably disproportion.
ate quantity. "86 It is suggested, though, that
the Code's rule be tempered by a bit of
statutory construction, for there are two
entirely different situations covered by the
general rule. First, where the seller is tendering an amount substantially in excess of
the estimate; second, where the quantity
tendered
is substantially
less. Section
2306 (1) should be regarded as a police
measure designed to prevent sellers from
dumping quantifies considerably
greater
than that which the estimate led the buyer
to expect.t" The seller is not harmed by
such a rule; he can still market the excess
quantity to other outlets. If, however, the
section is interpreted
as preventing the
seller from tendering a quantity substantially less than the estimate, even though
it is his entire output, inequitable results
will flow. For instance, in Biglione v.
Bronge, ~8 the seller agreed to deliver his
entire' crop of grapes, contractually estimated at about 130 tons. Due to a crop
failure, he was able to produce only 661j2
tons, which he delivered. Biglione held this
was not a breach, and it is submitted that
the same result should be reached under the
Code on grounds that this is the seller's
"actual output as occurred in good faith"
even though it is "unreasonably
disproportionate
to the stated estimate."
Of
course, where the seller has deliberately
curtailed production for reasons other than
the avoidance of loss, his conduct could
be deemed bad faith and a breach declared,
.but where the quantity substantially below estimate is due to circumstances beyond his control delivery of the seller's
entire output should be held sufficient. Any
other rule, it is submitted, would place
output sellers in 'an economically untenable position, for they are almost always
small producing units who, when output is
below: estimate, will be suffering enough
from a bad year and therefore probably
unable to withstand the additional blow
of a large damage award.
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Performance and Breach
A seller performs his output contract
only by tendering his entire production
(or a percentage thereof, if the contract
is so limited)
even if, in the seller's
opinion, some of the goods do not meet
the quality standard establ'ished by the
agreement. 89 The buyer is free to reject
any part of the tender not conforming to
the predetermined quality standard, but he
must accept all of the seller's output which
is of the warranted quality.P? Deliveries
must be made by the seller as often as they
are reasonably demanded; he is not free
to bunch his deliveries or make them whenever he chooses.P!
Breach occurs most often when the
seller fails to deliver his entire output.I"
Another form of breach is what might
be colloquially described as running in a
ringer-· -purchasing
goods in the market
after a price drop and tendering them as
part of output. 93 And under certain conditions breach can occur by the unreasonable
expansion of reduction of output, or abandonment or sale of the output unit. 94
CONCLUSION

When more obscure statutes are drafted,
doubtless they will be promulgated in California, but it seems difficult to believe
that anyone will ever surpass the extraordinary
incomprehensibility
of Section
2306 (1). It creates so many more problems than it solves that legitimate query
may be made whether it should be kept on
the statute books. So long as it remains,
however, courts and counsel alike will have
to regard it not as an aid to equitable results but as a barrier. to be overcome in
retaining reason as the touchstone of commercial contracts.
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to change of possession, but this section is included only
to accommodate certain bodies of nonsales law-primarily,
imposition
of sales taxes-which
have come to rely on
passcge of title under sales law as determinative
of
certain incidents in these other bodies of law. N01le of
the consequences which hinged on passage of title under
the Uniform Sales Act-such
as risk of loss and liability
for the price~are
determined by "title" under the Code;
rather, each of these former incident of title are now
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REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND
THE SIX MONTH HOLDING PERIOD
(Continued from page 41)
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John

1962, pp.

am 'dead. All the rest I leave to the St.
Anne's Old Folks Home, where all the
people were nice to me."
By a subtle and evil trick of the Law,
"brother, Harry'Lbeoomes "aggrieved'? and
takes a share of this estate under Section
41.
. The record . -is rich with cases so h6ldmg,.,
The time has long fallen .due for the
legislature to act upon this archaic and unjust law. Probate Code 41 should be repealed.
LOYOLA DIGEST

NEWS FROM THE
LAW LIBRARY
By Professor Richard Rank,
Law Librarian
By January 1, 1966 the Loyola University School of Law Library
collection
reached 70,000 volumes, thus passing into
the category of the so-called "mediumsized" law school libraries.
According to a survey compiled by Mr.
John G. Hervey, Adviser to the American
Bar Association, Loyola University of Los
Angeles School of Law Library has advanced from the 93d place, which it occupied as of July 1, 1963 to the 51st place
by July 1, 1965 out of a total of 135 Law
School Libraries. By January 1, 1966 our
Law School Library advanced to the 54th
place by reaching the 70,000 volume mark.
Although the quantity of the collection does
not necessarily imply the quality of the
collection, still the number of volumes acquired is one way of measuring the progress
of a library toward its goal of excellence.
During the Fall, 1965 the Law Library
received three grants: one from Mrs. Anita
S. Watson of Los Angeles, to build up our
Admiralty Collection, one from Mr. Morris
B. Pendleton, of Los Angeles, for the purchase of materials relating to business and
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commerce and to develop our Trade Regulation Collection, and the third from Title
Insurance & Trust Company to establish a
collection in Land Use Controls and Zoning.
Loyola University School of Law is the
host for the Conference of Western Law
Schools Apri! 15-16, 1966. In this connection; a special law librarians' meeting is
planned at our Law Library. Speakers will
include Professors Marian G. Gallagher,
University of Washington, 1. Myron Jacobstein, Stanford University, School of Law,
and Riley Paul Burton, University
of
Southern California, School of Law.
Amongsome notable recent acquisitions
of the Law Library during the Fall, 1965
are the following:
Bender's Uniform Commercial Code seru. ice. Albany, N. Y., Matthew Bender,
1963-65. 4 vols.
This is a looseleaf service. One volume
is a reporter-digest;
one covers forms and
procedure; and two volumes cover secured
transactions .:
Cavitch, Zolman. Business organizations
with tax planning. Albany, N. Y.,
Matthew Bender, 1963-65. 10 vols.
An extensive and important work covering -many phases of corporation and partnership law, this is a treatise kept current
by looseleaf supplements.
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Sowards, Hugh 1. The Federal Securities
Act; analysis, procedures, forms. AI·
bany, N. Y., Matthew Bender, 1965.
1 vol. looseleaf.
This volume is intended as an integral
part of Cavitch's Business Organizations.
Simpson, Laurence P. and Richard W.
Dusenberg. New York contracts law.
Brooklyn,
Edward
Thompson
Co.,
1963. 3 vols. (Encyclopedia of New
York law, vols. 6-8)
This work is a thorough treatment of
the law by one of the outstanding authorities in the field of contracts, Loyola's own
Professor "Larry" Simpson. The title was
a gift to the School of Law Library donated by Mr. Robert Steinberg in honor
of the appointment of Mr. Lloyd Tevis
as Dean of the Law School.
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. Trade
regulation reports. Chicago, Ill., CCH,
1965. 5 vols. looseleaf.
This is one of the standard
porters.

CCH re-

Benedict, Erastus C. The law of American admiralty; its practice with forms
and directions. 6th-7th eds. revised
and enlarged in scope by Arnold Whitman Knauth
and Christopher
R.
Knauth.
New York and Albany,
Matthew Bender and Baker, Voorhis,
1940-41, 1958-59. 6 vols. in 9.
This is a classic work in the field kept
current by pocket supplements. The latest
set is comprised of the 6th ed. vols. 1-4
. and index plus 7th ed. vols. 5-6A.
British shipping laws. London, Sevens &
Sons. v. 11961This is a series of important publications
in the field of British admiralty law of
which some 11 volumes have been published to date. This series is supplemented
by pamphlets containing current' materials.
McKay, Robert B. Reapportionment:
the
law and politics of equairepresentation. New York, Twentieth Century
Fund, 1965. 498 p.
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The author, an authority in the field of
constitutional
law, has been one of the
leaders in the effort for reapportionment.
California.
Governor's Commission on
the Los Angeles Riots. Violence in the
city-an
end or a beginning? Los
Angeles, Jeffries Banknote Co., 1965.
101 p.
This is the text of the McCone Commission report on the 1965 Watts riots.
Cavers, David F. The choice-of-law process. Ann Arbor, Mich., University of
Michigan Press, 1965.336 p. (Thomas M. Cooley lecture series).
This book in the field of conflict of
laws by an outstanding authority is one
of the best of recent years.
Goldstein, Joseph and Jay Katz. The
family and the law. New York, Free
Press, 1965. 1229 p.
The work deals with problems for decision in the family law process and is
concerned both with legal and psychoanalytical, with theoretical and clinical aspects
of the problems. It is a gift to the Law
Library by Dean Lloyd Tevis.
Slovenko, Ralph. Sexual behavior and
the law. Springfield, IlL, Charles C.
Thomas, 1964. 886 p.
This is a serious and documented study
of the various problems of the subject by
leaders in the fields of law, psychiatry and
sociology.
Blashfield, De Witt Clinton. Blashfield
Automobile law and practice. 3d ed.
Editorial
consultant
Frederick
D.
Lewis. St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1965. To .be complete in
17 vols.
'
This new edition presently has 5 volumes published. The work gives thorough
coverage to the legal problems connected
with automobiles which account for 75%
of all litigation. in the courts.
At the present time,
is featuring an exhibit
various local, national
bar associations and law

the Law Library
of publications by
and international
societies.
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INTERVIEW WITH NEW LAW SCHOO'L DEAN
Lloyd Tevis has recently been appointed
Dean of Loyola Law School.
, It was barely two years ago that Loyola
Law School was physically moved from its
archaic quarters to its present modern edifice, and with this change of address came
a change of attitude and vision. Increased
enrollment, higher admission standards, expanded full-time faculty, and a host of
other administrative problems greeted Dean
Tevis when he took the reins of leadership
upon the retirement of Dean J. Rex Dibble.
Dean Tevis has accepted and welcomed
these responsibilities
in the same manner
and style of retired Dean Dibble.
Shortly after the transposition from Assistant Dean to Dean, a question and answer
period was conducted by the Digest in order
to elicit the views of the new Dean on
various issues concerning the School.
The following is an all too brief extract
of that interview:
Q: Please comment on the case method.
R: Dean Tevis indicated that to some extent a reappraisal
is being made of the
case method as an effective to~l of teaching. He specifically rr'Ientioned that it is his
opinion that the case method is not especially useful for teaching third year law
students.
At this point, Dean Tevis digressed into
a project that he would like to see come
about. He would like to see each student
do a substantial piece of writing of law
review quality before graduation.
This
would be in addition to the legal writing
honors program now in force.

Q: Please comment on the possibility of
a Law Review.
R: Dean Tevis indicated the'idea is not
dead. The problem he faces is twofold: a)
a need for increased faculty and b) need
for money. The first need is being somewhat fulfilled by Loyola's plans to ever expand its faculty. Dean Tevis was quite explicit in his desire that if there is a Law
Review, it would not be viewed as an alternative to the Teaching Fellow program.
Dean Tevis was also quite explicit as to the
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character the law review would have. It
would be completely intra-mural. That is to
say, he does not want it to be- conceived
of as the usual faculty publication where
a student article would appear as the exception rather than as the rule.
Q: Does Loyola have any future plans
for offering a Masters Program?
R: Dean Tevis, reply was, "No." He mentioned a dream of retired Dean Dibble to
have a Graduate Workshop. This workshop would strike a middle ground between
on the one hand a post graduate program;
and on the other hand, what is done by
the California Continuing Education of the
Bar program. There would be intensive research on a narrow topic. This idea of a
graduate work shop in the possible future
is not dead.
Q: Please comment on the topic of civil
disobedience.
R: Dean Tevis indicated that as an Administrator naturally he would take a somewhat cautious approach. He distinguished
between. 1) violating a law for the purpose ~f testing its validity-this
type of
civil disobedience he approved of; and 2)
violating a law simply to gain publicity or
possibly to harrass or coerce conduct on
the part of the rest of society-this
type
he disapproved of on two grounds. First,
since the goal was not to test the validity
of the law in question, the laws was being
violated. Second, such conduct is a poor
tactic. For example, the average citizen
who is caught in a two hour traffic jam
because of civil rights protest is probably
going to view their cause less favorably
than if he had not been so inconvenienced.
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THE VALUE OF
PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE IN
CHILD CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS
By Robert L. Charbonneau*
The law in this country has traditionally
r~flected a pre-occupation
with the life,
liberty, and property
of "individuals."
Since 1791, when these freedoms were first
articulated in the Bill of Rights, they have
been zealously protected in our judicial tribunals. But this judicial zeal has been sadly
lacking in a legal forum whose purpose
i? even more important than the protection of individual liberties. In child custody proceedings, a judicial determinati~n
transcends the rights of the immediate litigants and affects the very foundation of
our society. A child custody proceeding is
not only a legal dispute, but also a social
problem. If the children of divorce are
emotionally scarred by the litigious process, society suffers. If a decree does not
reflect the best interests of the children
..
'
commumties may later be burdened with
mal-adjusted individuals who are unable to
make useful contributions to society.
California
Code of Civil Procedure
Section 138, provides that: "in awardin~
custody, the court is to be guided . . . (1)
by what appears to be for the best interests
of .the child ... " To accomplish this legis[ative mandate, it is imperative that all
available sources of information be utilized
that will aid the court in deterimning which
parent should be awarded custody.
'. One source of information that can proVI?e a penetrating insight into the personality of the parents and· their fitness to
ra~se well-adjusted children is psychiatric
evidence, Such evidence is particularly valuable when it contains an anlysis of a parent's personality in terms of the ability of
that p~rson. to interact in a meaningful
way with children.
In many divorce and child custody matters, there is no need for psychiatric evi*Member California
uate.
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dence because the court can readily dis. cern who is better suited to raise the children without requiring
psychiatric
data.
When a party is an alcoholic, drug addict,
or prostitute, a proper exercise of discretion
dictates that custody be awarded to the
other parent. In these cases, psychiatric
evidence has little to contribute. But there
are others cases where both parents appear
normal and capable of raising the children.
In some situations, one of the parents may
have previously suffered a nervous breakdown, or once been committed to a mental
institution, and the court is interested in
knowing whether a relapse is possible. In
these cases psychiatric evidence should be
considered unless it is unreliable and unable to make a worthwhile contribution to
the proper disposition of the case.
The word "psychiatry" evokes mixed reactions in the legal profession. There are
those who accept psychiatry as a useful
handmaid of the law, while others shun it
as an unwelcome guest in our legal forums.
The skeptics are vocal, but not convincing;
the criticisms are many, but none are
telling.
Some critics point to the contradictory
testimony of psychiatrists
in support of
their contention that psychiatry is unreliable exidence. It has been said that· ,
The growth of psychiatry as a science
is less than 100 years Old, compared with
other sciences and is responsible for much
of the contention and contradictory testimony in the courts.'
But the "battle of experts" is not peculiar
to ~sychiat.ri~ testimony. Conflicting expert
testimony WIll be found in every legal
forum on practically every legal issue. The
litigants and their witnesses, by the very
nature of the adversary process, will inva~iably disagree with each other. Psychiatry should not be singled out as the
scapegoat for the alleged abuses that have
crept into the adversary system in the use
of expert testimony. Some of the reluctarice
to rely on psychiatric evidence could be .
reduced if judges, as a preliminary question
outside the presence of the jury, detern:ined that the witness was not merely a
disreputable charlatan motivated solely by
LOYOLA DIGEST

mercenary reward, but highly qualified in
his profession and able to make a contribution that would give the court a better
understanding of the litigants,
There is another criticism that is more
persuasive if the nature and purpose of
psychiatric
techniques are not properly
understood. The brevity of psychiatric interviews has been criticized by people who believe that it is impossible to properly evaluable a person's personality without prolonged observation. These critics assert that
a psychiatrist will often disguise his shallow
understanding of the patient by the indiscriminate use of diagnostic labels, as psychotic, paranoid, or schzophrenic, without
explanation. The charge that this is a substitute for ignorance is sometimes welltaken. But in these matters, "it is not the
time spent, but the skill of the interviewer
that is crucial.l" Jules H. Masserman, an
authority on Dynamic Psychiatry, stresses
the experience of the interviewer.
"With empathy and experience the examiner will more readily sense the touchy
apprehension of the anxiety neurotic, ...
the demanding self-pity of the depressive
and the dereistic withdrawal and impaired
or eviant rapport of the schizoid or schizophrenic."3
In these matters, it is not the quantity of
the interviews, but the skill and experience
of the psychiatrist which are the significant
factors.
The most significant criticism is made
by those who repudiate the reliability of
psychiatric evidence because the theories
a?d .hypotheses which support psychiatric
fIndIngs cannot be scientifically verified.
Critics assert that psychiatry is still enchanted by Freud's theories of behavior
with their pre-occupation on sex, and tha~
the leading theorists who have broken away
from Freud's influence are in hopeless disagreement. There is some basis for this criticism. Psychiatry is just emerging as a science and disagreement is inevitable. But
even the law, in spite of its conservatism,
ha? permitted the widespread use of psychIatric evidence in criminal and civil cases.
The proponents of psychiatric evidence are
only demanding that information derived
from generally accepted hypotheses be more
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widely used in the courts. One example
is the psychiatric principle that a person's
personality and behavior patterns are primarily formed by interpersonal
familiar
relationships in childhood. A rejected or
neglected child will exhibit personality
traits in later life that are attributable
to lack of parental love when he was
a child. Conversely, a person who receives love and affection in early childhood is better suited to interact amiably
in society as an adult because his initial
contacts with people were psychologically
'rewarding to him. Because of the general
acceptance of this psychiatric principle, it
assumes the characteristics of reliable evidence and should be considered in cases
where the personality of the litigant is in
Issue.
For some people, psychiatry is a mysterious psuedo-science that is nothing more
than witchcraft on a subconscious level.
People are quick to crticize something they
do not understand, and psychiatry is often
misunderstood. To properly evaluate the
reliability of psychiatric evidence, it is necessary to understand the nature and purpose of psychiatric techniques. The most
widely used psychiatric technique today is
the dynamically oriented psychiatric interview. Unlike organic psychiatry, which is
closely affiliated with medicine and employ more standardized methods of assessing the patient, dynamic psychiatry is concerned with subconscious motivation for
behavior.
Organic psychiatrists
seek descriptive
classifications
of
conscious
behavior
through the use of various intellectual tests,
electro:shock therapy, and other procedures,
while the dynamic psychiatrist is more concerned with probing the subconscious mind
td seek explanations for consciously expressed behavior patterns. Because dynamic
psychiatry is more concerned with motivation, it seems preferable in custody proceedings, although other tests can be used
to supplement findings derived from a psychiatric interview.
Because interpersonal familial relationships'
childhood are significant in the
later development of the personality, the

in
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psychiatrist seeks to elicit the patient's attitude towards his parents, brothers and
sisters. Destructive character traits in members of the family, as physical brutality
affect a young child. Such information will
help to explain the litigant's personality
and his suitability to raise children. Rejection by peer groups, as schoolmates,
often has an enduring effect on a young
boy or girl. The psychiatrist seeks to elicit
such information and develops the "personal history" of the patient with skillful
and probing questions. Jules Masserman
tsresses the importance of taking a skillful
history of the patient. .
"A psychiatric
history is not merely a
chronologie account of the pa.tient's life,
but an attempt to discern those characteristic patterns of behavior which constitute his personality and therefore possess
psychiatric diagnostic and prognostic. value. The aim, therefore, is not only to. determine what happened to the patient, but
also (a) his total response to what happened, and (b) perhaps how, consciously
or not, he arranged for the repetition of
similar experiences."«
-The parent's present environment is also
significant. Some people adapt well in one
life situation and act neurotically in another
where there is greater stress. There is some
truth in the statement that "neurosis is situational." The religion of the litigant and
the firmness of his beliefs are also important in custody cases because strong religious beliefs are indicative of emotional
stability. The intensity of the religious belief can be measured in the psychiatric
interview.
To ensure greater ·accuracy, the psychiatrist should consider transcripts
prior
hearings, and statements of interested parties, relatives and teachers. He should separately interview both parents, and' the
children. In many cases a group interview
is beneficial because the psychiatrist can
observe the interaction of the parents with
the children. Supplemental
psychological
tests can also be helpful. If the first interview is inconclusive, the psychiatrist should
notify the court that more time is necessary
before writing his report. Because the interVIews are relatively short, these supple-
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mental materials can be effectively used
to compliment the personal observations of
the interviewer and reduce the chances of
diagnostic inaccuracies.
The
"manic
depressive
psychosis"
graphically illustrates the contribution that
psychiatric evidence can make to the proper
disposition of a child custody case. A psychosis involves the total personality of the
individual, and loss of contact with reality.
In manic depressive cases, suicidal ideas
occur in approximately 75% of the cases,"
and actual suicide attempts are mage by
at least 10 or 15510.6 The largest number
of patients are women between the ages of
20 and 35.7 The danger is compounded
when the manic depressive psychotic is a
mother.
"Young mothers who undergo psychotic
depressions often plan to destroy not only
themselves but their children, who are presumably considered by the pa.tient as an
extension of herself. Newspaper reports
about mothers who have killed themselves
and their little children in most cases refer
to patients suffering from unrecognized
attacks of manic-depressive
psychosis."8
Such a person appears perfectly normal
between seizures, and an unsuspecting judge
could award custody to a mother with this
major psychosis because he observed her
'during a lucid interval when she appeared
to be a fit parent. In these cases, psychiatric
evidence can make an invaluable contribution. In the case of Bowler v. Bowler, 355
Mich. 686, 96 NW 2d 1'29, (1959), the
custody of the children was removed to
the father after psychiatric evidence uncovered a manic depressive psychosis in the
mother. The court held that the passing
observations and testimony of friends and.
neighbors supporting the mother and mentioning her lucid intervals could not "challenge the clear, careful, and detached testimony of three reputable psychiatrists.'?"
The courts in child custody. proceedings
cannot afford the luxury of gambling that
such a psychosis is not seething within a
litigant. The children of divorce are wards
of the court, and the law is remiss in its
sacred duty if psychiatric evidence can
make a contribution and is not considered
in child custody proceedings.
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THE COURT APPOINTED
PSYCHIATRIST IS PREFERABLE
CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
(subtopic)

IN

The adversary process _is the heart of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. Its great redeeming quality is to maximize the probability that all the facts will be presented.
The courts are perpetually in search of
the truth, add the peculiar nature of the adversary process is best adapted to serve
this purpose. It works admirably well in
criminal and civil cases, but its function
may be outweighed by other considerations
in child custody proceedings. The adversary
system does not -have compassion for the
children of divorce. Their pain and grief
is the by-product of accusations and recriminations which fester within the framework
of the adversary process in its most bellicose form. The system promotes evidential
warfare, including the use of conflicting
psychiatric testimony, in an inappropriate
legal forum. The error is the misapplication of an otherwise invaluable judicial
process into a legal proceeding where children are involved. The adversary process, in
seeking to further the pursuit of truth, has
a noble purpose, but the means employed
are sometimes bestial in child custody proceedings. Psyphiatrist experts are paid to
testify in open court that the other parent is
unfit to raise children, and although their
honesty may be unquestioned, their objectivity may be compromised. The parents
usually end up being extremely bitter, and
the verbal carnage often overflows to adversel Y' affect the children.
Abolition of the adversary system in
child custody proceedings is not necessarily
the desired result, but the system surely •
can tolerate a 'modification' if the best
interests of the children demand it. Concern for the children 'is primary, and other
cherished notions must bend, if necessary,
to effectuate this purpose. The welfare of
the children demand that all available
sources of information be utilized in child
custody cases. This includes the use of
'court appointed psychiatrists' when necessary. Complete impartiality is unattainSPRING, 1966

able when the human element is involved,
but it is more probably present when the
expert is not financially interested in the
case. Such psychiatric evidence is not the
exclusive evidence in such cases, and the
value of the adversary process could be
preserved by subjecting the author of the
psychiatric report to cross-examination. It
is beyond the scope of this short article to
suggest the mechanics of this 'modification,'
but the concern for the children seems to
demand the utilization of impartial expertise in some manner.
The following quote is an appropriate
conclusion to this article.
"A custody case is not only a legal matter. It is also a social problem. Moreover,
in order to accomplish the avowed objectives of the law of custody-the
furtherance of the best interests of the child and
his placement with a fit person-c-it is imperative that social and psychiat!ic information be . produced for the guidance of
judicial dtscretion. These avowed objectives are bound to' be frustrated if the contest is viewed as a determination of property rights and if the court continues to
think in terms of rewarding virtue and
punishing sin . . .
.
Where there is no family court, traditional procedure should be relaxed so that
problem-solving rather than contest supervision becomes the principal aim. The court
should think in terms of planning for the
child's future and should seek guidance
from the parties, counsel, its own experts,
and experts provided by the- parties.
The reports and testimony of such experts would not be used to ':1surp )
responsibility, but rather to' aid deCISIOn.
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S~RING DANCE
HIGHLIGHTED WITH
LIBEL SHOW
Over forty years of law student frustration was finally unleashed and revealed
at the "libel show" held during the annual
Spring Formal. It marked the first such
attempt by Loyola law students in the
school's history. The locus in quo of the
event was the Regency Room of the Sheraton West Hotel on March 26, 1966. Before
a packed audience of students, faculty, and
friends, the various classes unveiled their
talents in a one hour satirical revue of the
faculty and administration procedures. The
room literally reverberated with laughter as
the show roamed the spectrum of law
school activities, punctuated with "folk"
songs and costumes to emphasize the point.
Messrs. McNally, Martinez, and Siracuse
highlighted the show with their "warm and
human" rendition of a Loyola "corporations lecture". There was nary a sacred
cow left when the show was concluded. It

is hoped that there will be a "second annual" libel show next spring.
Music, drinks, and a champaign raffle
preceded the show. The Board of Bar Governors presented Professor Dibble with an
engraved ships' compass in gratitude for
his years of service as Dean of the law
school. Awards were also presented to the
Scott Moot Court Competition winners.

GLADYS TOWLES ROOT
TO SPEAK AT
LOYOLA LAW SCHOOL
The Loyola Chapter of Phi Delta Della
is sponsoring Miss Root in the Kennedy
Moot Court Auditorium
at 6:30 Friday
evening, April 22nd. Her topic will encornpass recent developments in the area of
criminal law, her specialized field. Refreshments will be served. All are invited
to attend.

FRATERNITY ROW
PHI DELTA PHI
A delegation of Phi Delta Phis from
the Law School attended Father Joseph
Donovan's Testimonial Dinner to extend
their warm congratulations.
Along with
Alumni and Civic leaders, the members of
Aggeler Inn of Loyola Law School express
their appreciation for Father's past services to the Law School and the legal com-~
munity. Furthermore Loyola Phi Delta Phis
are indebted to Father Donovan as one of
the founders of Aggeler Inn.
This year's rush program has been the
most successful in recent years. More than
fifty outstanding men from the first, second, and third year classes pledged Phi
Delta Phi. The fraternity actives are looking forward to the contributions that these
future actives will make to the fraternity,
Law School, and eventually the community.
On March 10th Phi Delta Phis hosted
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the lovely young ladies of Delta Gamma
sorority
from U.C-L.A. This exchange
should give the young single men, including some of the older and less successful
actives, an opportunity to find dates for the
"Ides of March" Cocktail Party. Greg Garrat and ..Roger McKee, who have done an
excellent job 'in organizing the Exchange,
have given the membership a warranty. of
"fitness," excluding any latent defects. The
Ides of March Party, with the fine planning
of Dick Stewart and Bill Christopher, \fill
be one of the best social events of the year,
Formal Initiation for all new actives will
be conducted in the California Supreme
Court Chambers, located in Downtown Los
Angeles, on Wednesday, April 6th. Dinner
will follow the formal initiation.
The final social event of the year will
culminate at the home of brother Bill MeAdam's parents. This Cocktail Party will
LOYOLA DIGEST

include honoring an outstanding member
of the faculty and installation of newly
elected officers.

PHI DELTA DELTA
WOlVIEN LAW STUDENTS
As we look back on the events of Phi
Delta Delta during this academic year, we
can be proud that our fraternity has been
re-activated.
Our aim this year was to
establish a closer association of the women
on campus in both day and evening divisions and to provide activities designed to
acquaint the women with the practice of
law through discussions with prominent attorneys in various fields of legal practice.
To some extent at least we attained those
goals. There is a warmth in the relationship of the members as manifested in the
"Pot Luck" dinner and the other "Get Togethers" which brought us together on several enjoyable occasions, carrying out the
strive towards a closer association which it
is hoped will continue to grow.
As to our second aim, we are sincerely
grateful to our outstanding guest speakers.
Justice Otto Kaus reviewed the course the
California Supreme Court has taken on the
question of the constitutional rights of the
individual sujected to criminal prosecution.
Miss Mary Creutz spoke on the procedural
techniques to use in personal injury litigation. Mr. Arnett Hartsfield discussed the
availability of the Neighborhood Legal Society's services for the indigent in civil
suits, which would be unavailable otherwise in a majority of cases. With the aid
of these able speakers" our dinner meetings
were most enlightening.

For the accomplishments of Phi Delta
Delta this year, one might look in the basement of the Law School there to find secluded among the many curves and corners
a door marked "Women's Lounge." The
Alumni Association of Phi Delta Delta has
begun a large fund-raising campaign to
furnish that lounge. To them we say, "thank
yea for being so kind." Incidentally, for
supplying the air conditioning, a "thank
you" goes to Dean Tevis and the University.
We are proud too of our seat on the
Board of Bar Governors which we intend
to continue using.
All in all it has been a wonderful and
a most memorable year. To the High Prieress for the academic year 1966-67, "Best
of Luck, and I hope you have a wonderful year too."

PHI ALPHA DELTA
On April 29, 1966, the brothers of PHI
ALPHA DELTA will gather at the Ports of
Call Restaurant for the fraternity's annual
dinner-dance. Special arrangements have
been made to insure that this year's dinnerdance will be a most outstanding affair.
A boat ride will climax the evening's festivities with dancing being continued on
board beneath the stars.
This will be the final social event of
the year which began with a rush party in
San Marino held early in September. Those
in attendance at the party danced to the
music of a fine combo and enjoyed hors
d'oeuvres and cocktails.

Two affairs, sponsored by the Alumni,
As High Priestess I want to express my
were
held at the Mona Lisa Restaurant this
de~pest appreciation
to Patricia Philips, ~
year
and were open to the brothers, The
Pnestess; Janet Chubb, Recorder; Patricia
first
such
event was held to honor judges
Lobello, Chancellor; and Marilyn Herzhaft,
who
are
members
of PHI ALPHA DELTA;
Chaplin. Having had the opportunity to
the
second
honered
PHI ALPHA DELTA
work with such a tremendous set of officers
alumni
who
had
been
members for over
made the year an exciting one indeed.
fifty years. The latter affair featured GoodWe are indebted to Miss Clara Kauff'win
Knight, former governor of California,
man who has been extremely generous in
as
'the
guest speaker.
assisting us whenever she was needed in her
PHI
ALPHA DELTA also wishes to conrole as our sponsor.
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vey its gratitude to Bill Henry, Nick Micelli, Richard Montes, John Pulskamp, Al
Ribakoff, John Chu, Don Cohen, Terry
Rolbin, Nelson Paine and Al Loskamp for
their fine assistance on the various affairs
held this year. Our appreciation extends
also to the officers of the fraternity who
this year were Kevin Lewand, Justice;
Myles Mattenson, Vice Justice; Richard
Montes, Secretary; Ron Cohen, Treasurer;
and Nick Micelli, Marshal.

Future events to be held this spring as
well as the dinner-dance will be a luncheon
at the Playboy Club, an Invitational Golf
Tournament and the Activation of pledges.
Each successive year the fraternity has
provided a greater number of quality functions and I am pleased to note that this year
has been a part of that upward trend. It
is with every confidence in the pledge class
of 1966 that I say that the trend is sure to
continue.

IN APPRECIATION
Time in its resistless March to Eternity
halted momentarily only a day ago, as the
fleeting hours are reckoned among the children of men, to salute the Regent of Loyola
Law School on completing
seventy-five
years of his earthly pilgrimage. Jack Anderson, to the manner born, with four valiant aides, Mike Clemens, with his enduring sense of humor, Frank Gray, master of
detail, Frank Hourigan, a pro in any project and Bob Nibley, the last word in knowhow, agreed that something should be done
about it lest it be lost in some half-forgotten
hour. Noiselessly, with no sound of axe or
hammer, not unlike the artisans of an elder
day, bringing to high fulfillment a great
cathedral, they created an image of rich
fantasy ringing vibrant with loyalty and
devotion, and aglow with a brother's hearty
handclasp. Oldsters of the Law, paced by
neophytes, hurried to pour out a libation
on the Altar of Brotherhood and to lay a
wreath of blossoms at the portals of remembrance.
Scholars in the Law, men who taught
and teaching pointed out to eager youth
the toilsome road to honors .and tempered
the climb with understanding sympathy ...
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and men who were taught and reflect the
lore of educated centuries . . . Jurists of
distinction, who are leaving their impress
on the jurisprudence of California and the
nation. All were recorded 'in the pledge of
fidelity.
As a perpetual reminder of the happenings of this day, there hangs the likeness
of a candid witness in the Law Library,
from the talented touch of the master.
The note of joyous jubilee struck at eventide, carried through candlelight and illumined the revelers' homeward way, deep
in rich recollection.
Any' expression of gratitude to those who
articipated in the jubilee, in the nature of.
things, must be totally inadequate .. .' The
Regent honestly recalls that he was quite
moved in attempting to give an expression
of his feelings on that night. With that in
mind, let me ask your indulgence in allowing him, despite repetition, to give a direct :
quote from that occasion. "All the thought
and labor that went into this splendid program, leaves me deep in your debt, but being in debt to such generous and understanding associates as are you, is a pleasant penalty and I love it."
LOYOLA DIGEST

AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAWSOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
REGIONAL MEETING, 1966
By- L. F. E. Goldie*
No Regional Meeting of the American
Society of International Law has been held
in Southern California for almost ten years.
This sorry position is to be remedied when,
on Saturday, April 23, of this year, such,
a meeting will be held in the John F.
Kennedy Memorial
Moot Court Room.
Loyola University School of Law and the
Los Angeles Bar Association are the joint
Sponsors of the venture. Associate Professor
L. F. E. Goldie of this Law School (and
writer of this note) is chairman of the organizing committee and is carrying out
most of the work of making general arrangements, drawing up the program, inviting speakers, contacting possible participants and circul larizing the intended audience.
Eminent judges, legal practitioners, law
teachers and scholars have together formed
a committee which gives the writer the advice and encouragement which are so essential to the carrying forward of such a
project as this to be a successful fruition.
Mr. Ralph Abee, of the General Counsel's
Office, Bank of America, has agreed to
undertake the tasks of Treasurer.
The general topic of the Meeting will be
"The Continental Shelf and Fisheries Rights
off the Pacific Coasts of North and South
America." The morning session's Chairman
will be Professor Hans W. Baade of Duke
University School of Law and Editor of
Law and Contemporary
Problems. Professor Baade is currently visiting the U.c.
L.A. School of Law: Mr. Goldie will give
the first paper-to
be entitled "The Continental Shelf: Twenty Years in Review."
This presentation is intended to provide an
historical and analytical introduction
to
the main issues confronting the Meeting,
':'Associate
of Law.

Professor
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and to suggest some of the questions which
brought about the choice of the Meeting's
topic.
Following
Mr. Goldie's
introduction
there will be a paper on the econom'icand
conservation problems of the 'resources of
the' seas which the present state of international law creates. After a short coffee
break the test of the morning will be devoted to a critical discussion of United
States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965)
by a number of leading lawyers active in
the case.
The morning session will be followed by
a buffet luncheon in the Library, and Dr.
William B. Stern will give an address on
the international, comparative, and foreign
law holdings of the County Law Library.
(It is one of the best collectior:s of its kind
in the world, indeed better WIth regard to
its fields of collection than that of the Peace
Palace Library at The Hague-a
fact which
has not been suf{i()iently well publicized.)
The morning session's topics have been
chosen for their generality of interest and
their utility to law school and college students taking international
law courses.
While still formulated as being of interest
to students, the afternoon session will also
be oriented towards practitioners' concerns.
The topics to be 'discu~s~d in th~ later session will be more specific and will take up
current political and legal problems ir:volvina the resources of the seas. ThIS
sessio; chaired by Professor Carl Q. Christol Pr~f~ssor of International Law, University of Southern California, will begin
with a discussion by Dr. John Mero of
Ocean Research Inc., San Diego, who will
talk on the mineral resources of the ocean
and of that new science, ocean mining. Dr.
Mero's presentation will be follo.wed ?y
talks on current United States policy WIth
regard to the arrests of Ameri~an tu~a
boats by Ecuador, Peru, and Chile while
fishing up to a two hundred se~ miles lim~t
from the mainland coast and Island terntories of those countries. Considerable interest should be generated at this point. a lawyer representing the San Diego and
Long Beach fishing interests will give the
main presentation of this phase of the Meet79

ing. In response to at least soine of the
challenges to these countries' laws which
may be expected, a very eminent South
American lawyer, who champions Ecuador's, Peru's, and Chile's two hundred miles
seaward claims, has been invited to give
one of the major papers of the Meeting,
So far no indication of his availability (or
otherwise)
has been received. Speakers
have also been invited to discuss fishery
problems of the North Pacific-particularly from the standpoint of problems faced
in Washington,
British Columbia,
and
Alaska.
.
A Round Table discussion will follow
the afternoon session. This will create an
opportunity for further examination of the
problems arising out of the day's activities.
Questions from the audience will be welcomed at this time, as at the other sessions
of the Meeting.
After the day's work is done there will
be a cocktail party (cash bar), and a banquet. No final catering arrangements for
these two important functions have been decided at the time of this writing (March
5,1966).
But one important item has been
settled: Lord Caradon, who is both Ambassador of Great Britain to the United

Nations and a very highly regarded public
speaker here in the United States, has accepted an invitation to be the Guest Speaker
at the banquet.
The charges which have been provisionally determined are:
(1) Registration, $7.00 (students free) ;
(2) Luncheon, included in registration;
(3) Cocktail Party, cash bar;
(4) Banquet, $8.00.
It may become necessary to charge those
students $2.50 or so who attend the luncheon-depending
on the other expenses, the
amount of advance registrations, and the
caterer's assessment and advice closer to
the time.
This writer hopes that the 1966 Regional
Meeting of the American Society of International Law in Southern California will
prove to be the first of many, of what will
become an annual event to be hosted, in
turn, by the Law Schools and Colleges of
Southern California.
In closing this writer would like to offer
his very sincere thanks to Miss Megan
Geffeney, Miss Lola McAlpin, and Mrs.
Alice Merenbach for so kindly agreeing to
do duty at the registration desk and to help
with "In formation."
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